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gress, but in the multifarious productions of the press for many months past; had the propositions made in the Senate of the United States for levying an army for the purpose of seizing New-Orleans been carried into effect, the issue must have been an immediate war with France; the expence of such a war for a single year would probably have exceeded the sum paid for Louisiana. But who could count the probable duration, or issue of such a war, with one of the most powerful nations in Europe? I pretend not to do it. Yet if we take into consideration the probable views of the French government in obtaining the cession of Louisiana from Spain, and the vigorous preparations they were making for the establishment of a military colony in that quarter, we can not but be surprised that they should have been prevailed on to abandon them altogether for so small a sum as fifteen millions of dollars.
Secondly; we have not only averted the impending danger of an immediate war with France, but we have obtained a perpetual guarantee against similar danger from the same quarter in future; a quarter, where we were weakest, and on many accounts most vulnerable.
There is no political axiom more just, than that neighbouring nations are seldom very cordial friends. And this extends to colonial neighbours, as well as others. Until the peace of 1763, the hostilities between the French and English colonists within the limits of the United States as now settled, were incessant. Even Spain, since the American revolution, has sometimes indicated an unfavourable disposition towards us. Had France taken possession of Louisiana, and made grants of land there, (as was probably her intention) as a remuneration to the officers and soldiers of her immense armies employed daring the late war, and established a military government, either there, or at New Orleans, it is probable that the United States
