formed, Mr. Seddon became Secretary of War, and when the war was over, I recognized his friendship by securing the removal of his disabilities under the Fourteenth Amendment. Of the Secessionists, Mr. Seddon was the leading man upon the floor of the convention. It was manifest that he did not wish to secure the return of the seceded States. On one point he was anxious, and he did not attempt to disguise his purpose. He sought to secure from the convention, or if not from the convention, from the delegates from the Republican States, an assurance that in no event should there be war. One of the errors, indeed, the greatest error, was the failure of the Northern delegates to assert that in no event should the Union be dissolved except through the success of the South in arms. As far as I remember, this was not asserted by any one except myself.
Many expressed their fear of war and urged the convention to agree to some plan of settlement as the only means of averting war. Mr. Stockton, of New Jersey, went so far as to assert that in case of war the North would raise a regiment to aid the South as often as one was raised to assail it. Mr. Chase’s remarks on the floor of the convention indicated a disposition to allow the South to go without resistance on our part, and in a conversation that I had with him as we walked one evening on Pennsylvania Avenue, toward Georgetown, he said:
“The thing to be done is to let the South go.”
The interest of the convention centered upon the Committee of Thirteen, of which Mr. Guthrie was chairman. While the Committee of Thirteen was considering what should be done, Mr. John Z. Goodrich said that he had called upon Mr. Seward, and that Mr. Seward expressed a wish to see me. I had not the personal acquaintance of Mr. Seward, and Mr. Goodrich offered to take me to Mr. Seward’s house. We called in the evening. His conversation and bearing were
