different from the conversation and bearing of most of the public men of the time. He spoke as though the subject of conversation was the chance of a client and the means of bringing him safely out of his perils. He spoke of the speech he had made in the Senate and said:
“My speech occupies the mind of the South for the present: then the proceedings of the Peace Congress will attract attention, and by and by we shall have the President’s inaugural which will probably have a good influence.”
He did not assume the possibility of war. Before we left he asked me whether I had seen a certain number of the Richmond Enquirer. I said that I had not. He sent for it, and gave it to me with the request that I should return it after reading the leading editorial. The editorial was upon Mr. Seward, and it was written upon the theory that he was engaged in a scheme for delaying definite action in Virginia and the other States of the South, until the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, when he would use both whip and spur. From the conversation and the editorial I inferred that he intended to have me understand that such was his purpose. It is possible he may have thought that war could be averted by dilatory proceedings.
When the report of the Committee of Thirteen was made, the border State men had high hopes that the country, both North and South, would accept its recommendations. In truth, there was no ground for believing that the Secessionists or the anti-slavery Republicans, would accept the propositions. The recommendations were more offensive to the North than the original constitution, with all the compromise legislation, considered together.
I think that there were five speeches made in support of the resolutions before a speech was made in opposition, and it fell to me to make that speech. One morning there was a conference between the Massachusetts delegation, which was
