serves, it seems to me, to increase the destructiveness of the enemy’s fire, especially at long ranges. In this war there has been more long-range rifle firing than ever before. The increased range of the infantry weapon is, of course, primarily responsible for this, and it has been found to be exceedingly effective. Variations in a rifle fire, even when directed at near-by objects, are very great, and at long range they are even greater. Thus a long-range infantry fire, even when directed at a conspicuous object, will sweep a large space. Then the distances within which troops are permitted to employ marching formations should be considerably extended. This may seem at first to be impractical, as occupying too much time in the attack, but I see no other solution of the problem of bringing an attacking force close to the enemy without having its morale too much shaken. In fact, this war has demonstrated that direct assaults upon established positions now occupy days, even weeks. Troops are pushed forward slowly and gradually, entrenching themselves, protected by the fire of their own artillery, as they advance, until near enough to deliver an effective assault. The Japanese required days to carry some of the Russian positions in recent battles, when most of their advances were made at night. Sometimes, when daylight attacks were attempted, hours would be required to advance a few hundred yards, gained by crawling from cover to cover. Rarely, even then, could strong positions be taken by frontal assault until a successful flanking movement had rendered them untenable. The continual use by the Japanese generals of flanking and counter-flanking movements shows that they regard frontal attacks more as a device to hold the opposing army than an effectual means to dislodge and defeat it. The losses sustained in such attacks seem justified by the damage inflicted upon the enemy when he is finally compelled to abandon his position and retreat unprotected. A major part of Russian losses in Manchuria were incurred while the troops were retiring from tactical positions.
Naturally, many delinquencies in fighting tactics on the part of the Russians have occurred, some of them reprehensible enough. I have seen infantry marched in close column formation to within 1,000 yards of Japanese artillery before being deployed. I have seen infantry stand for hours in close formation, while waiting for other troops to get into position, suffering all the time slight losses from a scattering rifle fire, and with adequate cover near at hand. Under these circumstances, the officers seemed to think that an attitude of indifference and bravado met the requirements of the situation. The Russian officers cling to the old theory of the officer’s part in tactics. He must show himself, encouraging his men by his demeanor. It may be that the Russian soldier, having been taught to expect this attitude in an officer, would be demoralized by its absence. If this is true, the sooner he is taught differently the better. Japanese officers are educated in the new school, and are extremely careful to take cover. The modern soldier must be directed rather than led. If he is well trained he does not need visible leadership. But he must have direction.
In this connection, I may say that certain conclusions based upon the Boer War will have to be modified. It then seemed that the whole tendency of modern warfare was toward a greater development of personal initiative in the soldier. I think even now that in any war the army which has developed the highest degree of personal initiative in its soldiery will win. But a large part of modern war is on too great a scale to give much opportunity for individual initiative. Soldiers can rarely tell what is going on, even in their immediate vicinity. They cannot always see the enemy they are firing at, and where they can see the object of their fire such important matters as range, and even direction, cannot be left to them. A great battle is bewildering, and troops left to their own initiative would soon expend their ammunition, and perhaps much of the time he shooting at their own comrades. Troops are clothed so much alike nowadays that it is very difficult to distinguish friend from foe at 500 yards, and large bodies of troops rarely get that close to each other in modern war while there is light enough to see clearly. Smokeless powder and devices for making troops less visible, together with long-range weapons, render targets often largely a matter of guesswork, even to officers provided with powerful glasses and special instruments for determining distances. Broadly speaking, both artillery and rifle fire are now handled largely with a view to general results, and their direction can only