be intrusted to officers. Even the line officers, who must transmit orders to the men on the firing line, must follow implicitly instructions received from superior officers, who are cognizant of the whole situation on that part of the field and know the object to gain which the whole plan is calculated. Thus, more than ever, the officer is necessary to secure good results, and he should be taught to expose himself as little as possible. Officers need not fear that any soldiery, however unintelligent, will be unable to distinguish between caution and cowardice. At any rate, a soldiery which cannot make this distinction is not likely to be very formidable in future wars.
I have noted two results of the use of smokeless powder. It makes the tactical handling of troops easier, since officers can now always see the men under their immediate command. General officers can no longer mark the progress of a battle by means of the smoke, which formerly revealed distinctly the positions of the lines, but must depend upon other means to follow the fortunes of the day. The prediction that the revelation of battlefield horrors, formerly screened by smoke, would demoralize troops has not been realized.
The old dispute about the bayonet is still unsettled. Enough use has been made of it in this war to justify its retention, especially since it involves so little added weight and bulk. Instances of bayonet use have been too insignificant to throw much light upon its actual value as a weapon, but it has been conclusively demonstrated that, notwithstanding the range and accuracy of weapons, it is still possible for considerable bodies of troops to come into physical collision. This war has demonstrated that the old-fashioned open trench is poor protection for infantry against modern artillery projectiles. The new shrapnel does considerable execution from overhead, and the longer range of artillery makes it difficult to lay out an entrenchment so that some of it cannot be partially enfiladed. Military engineers will find scope for their invention in designing an entrenchment for infantry capable of being quickly constructed and which will afford protection from modern shrapnel.
Little use of cavalry, as such, has been made in this war so far as it has gone; which will bear out those who have long predicted that modern weapons had practically destroyed the tactical utility of this picturesque and once formidable arm. In the few occasions where cavalry has fought in this war it has been used as mounted infantry. There has been no use of cavalry against cavalry of sufficient magnitude to be significant. It seems certain that cavalry cannot hope to successfully engage infantry or artillery except under conditions that rob those arms of their ordinary effectiveness. It must be admitted, however, that both armies have been deficient in cavalry. Both the Russian and Japanese cavalry are armed with the infantry rifle, and in rearming the American army this plan has also been adopted. In the service of security and information mounted troops are still, as ever, invaluable, and in this war such troops have performed their usual functions neither so well nor badly as to attract special notice. Armies must have mounted troops, but the inclination to throw away sabre and lance seems to be gaining ground. Still, it is too soon to rule cavalry off the battlefield, and experience must discredit the arm more than it has before this will happen.
Artillery has, in this war, not lost the impulse given by its effective use in the war between France and Germany, when the arm took on new life. It has again conclusively demonstrated its tactical importance, and it is clear that the limit of development has by no means been reached. Longer range, increased rapidity of fire, and improved projectiles have greatly added to the effectiveness of artillery. The field-guns used in this war have an extreme range of about four miles, the Russian weapon being slightly superior in this respect to that used by the Japanese. As range has increased, there has been a revolution in the tactical use of artillery. The old dashing use of artillery, like that of cavalry, is no longer possible. Nearly all that was formerly so spectacular in its tactics has vanished. We no longer see batteries dashing at full gallop across a battlefield, the limbers and guns bounding madly after the excited animals, to take up a new position. It is seldom that any considerable part of an army’s artillery changes position during an action, or if such a move becomes necessary, it is usually undertaken at night.
Hardly any opportunity for initiative re-