Page:Shannon v. Wilson.pdf/5

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Ark.]
Shannon v. Wilson
Cite as 329 Ark. 143 (1997)
147


After leaving City Liquor, the three boys began drinking as they drove to St. Paul, Arkansas. At a pool hall in St. Paul, David Farmer exited the vehicle. Charles Shannon and Jarred Sparks remained in the vehicle drinking the rest of the liquor. At some time, the two boys left the pool hall in the pickup.

At approximately 9:10 p.m., the Arkansas State Police were notified of an accident in Madison County. Arriving at the scene, police found the Ford pickup had left the road, traveled through a fence, hit a telephone pole and finally come to rest after hitting a tree. The police surmised that the pickup was traveling at excessive speed and that the accident occurred while the driver was attempting to negotiate a curve. Jarred Sparks was found in the driver's seat of the truck and Charles Shannon in the passenger's seat. Both were pronounced dead at the scene. Blood tests revealed that Jarred Sparks had a blood-alcohol level of .10% and that Charles Shannon had a level of .07%.

Marlan Dale Shannon, father of Charles Shannon and executor of the estate, filed suit asserting that appellees were negligent in selling alcohol to the three minors. The complaint alleged that it was foreseeable that the minors who purchased the liquor at a drive-through window would drive the vehicle on the roads of Arkansas thereby endangering their health and safety as well as that of other persons traveling on the roads. The trial court granted the appellee's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Appellant appeals the dismissal and urges that the law in Arkansas be changed to recognize the potential liability for a vendor who knowingly sells alcohol to minors.

In Carr v. Turner, supra, this Court first addressed the issue of whether a person who was injured in a collision with a drunk driver had a cause of action against a tavern owner whose unlawful sale of liquor brought upon the inebriation. This Court determined, at that time, that it should follow the view of the majority of other jurisdictions in observing the common-law view that the proximate cause of any subsequent accident was the consumption of liquor, not its sale. Id. at 890 (citations omitted).

In Carr, we noted that the enactment of a dramshop act by the legislature would be the appropriate method to change the