Cite as 329 Ark. 143 (1997)
common-law principle. This Court in Carr examined two existing Arkansas statutes to determine whether in either of them the legislature had acted to change the common-law rule. The first statute directed that liquor be sold in packages and not consumed on the premises; this was enacted to avoid the return of "saloons" to the State. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 48-309 (Repl. 1946), recodified at Ark. Code Ann. § 3-3-604 (Repl. 1996). The second statute established a misdemeanor crime for anyone who sold or gave away liquor to a minor, a habitual drunkard, or an intoxicated person. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 48-901 (1947), recodified at Ark. Code Ann. § 3-3-206-210 (Repl. 1996).
This Court determined that neither of these two statutes changed the common-law rule of nonliability. In making this determination, we noted that the majority of other jurisdictions adhered to this principle and that the "cases finding liability are so few that they may be reviewed quickly." Carr, 238 Ark. At 891.
Since Carr, this Court has been entreated to reevaluate the issue of a seller of alcohol's liability on numerous occasions. Repeatedly we have held that absent a change in the common-law principle by the legislature, this Court would not depart from the ruling in Carr and its progeny.
In Milligan v. County Line Liquor Inc., 289 Ark. 129, 709 S.W.2d 409 (1986), we addressed the issue of liability for the provider of alcohol. In Milligan, the appellee, County Line Liquor, was charged with violation of an Arkansas statute by selling beer to a minor. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 49-8-901 (Repl. 1977). We upheld the premise that there is no liability for selling alcohol, even in the instance where a statute was violated. Specifically, we held:
It may be that a Dramshop Act is to be desired, but such a measure should be the result of legislative action rather than of judicial interpretation. The primary purpose of this appeal is to see if we will reverse our position and now adopt such a measure by judicial fiat. . . . we decline to change our position because of the essential soundness of the commnon-law rule. That is, it is the consumption of intoxicants, not the sale standing alone, which is the proximate cause of injuries.
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in ruling that as a matter of law there was no proximate cause between violation of
