Cite as 329 Ark. 143 (1997)
the statute prohibiting the sale of beer to a minor and the accident. The argument, in essence, is simply another way to contend that Ark. Stat. Ann. 48-901 (Repl. 1977) is a Dramshop Act. We have previously rejected the argument. In Carr v. Turner, supra, we stated it is clear that in enacting Ark. Stat. Ann. 48-901 the General Assembly did not intend to change the common-law rule of nonliability.
In several cases following Milligan, we rejected appeals to deviate from the Carr v. Turner rule. In Yancy v. The Beverage House of Little Rock, Inc., 291 Ark. 217, 723 S.W.2d 826 (1987), the appellee twice sold alcohol illegally to a minor; on the second occasion, the minor was intoxicated at the time of the sale. The minor then had an accident where two teenagers were killed. Also, in First American National Bank of North Little Rock v. Associated Hosts, Inc., 292 Ark. 445, 730 S.W.2d 496 (1987), a "happy hour" customer was allowed to leave the bar in an intoxicated state after having consumed more than a dozen drinks in three hours. Upon leaving the bar, the customer fell and was injured. In both of these cases, we reaffirmed the Carr holding of nonliability for the seller of alcohol. In 1995, we again held in Mann v. Orrell, 322 Ark. 702, 912 S.W.2d 1 (1995), that the holdings of Carr and its progeny were controlling and that there is no liability to be imposed on tavern owners or liquor store owners for injury to a patron or third person when injury results from the consumption of alcohol.
Since 1965, our holdings have been consistent in declining to impose liability on the provider of alcohol by holding that the proximate cause of any injuries later occurring is the consumption of the alcohol, not its sale. In fact we have continually stated that a dramshop act is the preferred measure to deal with this issue and that "such a measure should be the result of legislative action rather than of judicial interpretation." Carr at 892, supra. For twenty years, we have followed precedents while stating that the legislature should address this issue, and we have held to the contention that replacing the common-law rule is a matter of public policy best left to the legislature. Despite this Court's preference for legislative action, there has been no action directly addressing this troublesome question; so, we will address this issue now.
