Page:Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College.pdf/125

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Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
19

Gorsuch, J., concurring

II

So far, we have seen that Title VI prohibits a recipient of federal funds from discriminating against individuals even in part because of race. We have seen, too, that Harvard and UNC do just what the law forbids. One might wonder, then, why the parties have devoted years and fortunes litigating other matters, like how much the universities discriminate and why they do so. The answer lies in Bakke.

A

Bakke concerned admissions to the medical school at the University of California, Davis. That school set aside a certain number of spots in each class for minority applicants. See 438 U. S., at 272–276 (opinion of Powell, J.). Allan Bakke argued that the school’s policy violated Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 270. The Court agreed with Mr. Bakke. In a fractured decision that yielded six opinions, a majority of the Court held that the school’s set-aside system went too far. At the same time, however, a different coalition of five Justices ventured beyond the facts of the case to suggest that, in other circumstances not at issue, universities may sometimes permissibly use race in their admissions processes. See ante, at 16–19 (opinion for the Court).

As important as these conclusions were some of the interpretive moves made along the way. Justice Powell (writing only for himself) and Justice Brennan (writing for himself


    Post, at 26–27, n. 21 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.). It is a bewildering suggestion. SFFA sued Harvard and UNC under Title VI. And when a party seeks relief under a statute, our task is to apply the law’s terms as a reasonable reader would have understood them when Congress enacted them. Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 4). To be sure, parties are free to frame their arguments. But they are not free to stipulate to a statute’s meaning and no party may “waiv[e]” the proper interpretation of the law by “fail[ing] to invoke it.” EEOC v. FLRA, 476 U. S. 19, 23 (1986) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Young v. United States, 315 U. S. 257, 258–259 (1942).