Case 1:22-cv-01564-BAH Document 17 Filed 02/07/23 Page 26 of 34
| C. | Neither Common Law Nor the Work-Made-for-Hire Doctrine are a Basis for Plaintiff to Claim Authorship of the Work |
Plaintiff is also incorrect that common law or the work made for hire doctrine permits him to claim a copyright interest in the Work.[1] See Dkt. 16 at 20–26. As explained above, copyright does not protect the creations of non-human authors therefore there is no interest to be claimed. No copyright in the Work exists and therefore Plaintiff’s common law property and work made for hire arguments do not alter the Office’s conclusion. However, for completeness, Defendants will address each argument.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s reliance on common law regarding property ownership is irrelevant because they involve physical rather than intangible property.[2] See Dkt. 16 at 21–24. It is a fundamental principle of intellectual property, confirmed in the Act, that ownership of a material object is distinct from ownership of intangible rights embodied in that object. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (“Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first
- ↑ At the outset, the Court should reject Plaintiff’s invocation of common law property principles as a basis for overturning the Office’s decision. Plaintiff did not cite these cases during the registration process, so the Office’s decision did not have the opportunity to consider them. See OddzOn Prods. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (because copyright registration argument “was not raised in the application proceedings, that question is not appropriately before us for review”).
- ↑ Plaintiff relies heavily on a proclamation from the King of Ireland in the 6th Century and state court cases establishing physical property principles. See Dkt. 16 at 21–22. Given that Plaintiff has described the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sarony and Mazer as “non-binding judicial opinions from the Gilded Age,” Dkt. 13-7 at US_0000029, decisions by state courts and foreign monarchs should be afforded no greater weight. See also Dkt. 16 at 15 (criticizing the Office for “relying on gilded age discussions of quasi-metaphysical creative sparks and dicta”).
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