Case 1:22-cv-01564-BAH Document 17 Filed 02/07/23 Page 27 of 34
fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object.”).[1] Plaintiff’s invitation to apply physical property doctrines such as accession and first possession to copyright would contravene the statutory scheme and upend the foundations of copyright law.[2]
Moreover, Plaintiff’s common law argument fails because it is foreclosed by the text and structure of the Act. Plaintiff suggests that because the Act references “operation of law,” that language permits common law principles to determine what material is protected by copyright. Dkt. 16 at 20. But “operation of law” is only mentioned as relevant for transfers of an existing copyright—not for whether a copyright exists in the first place. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (“ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law”); id. § 204(a) (copyright transfers must be in writing unless transfer is “by operation of law”). Section 102(a), the subject matter of copyright, and § 201(a), which provides that copyright “vests initially in the author or authors of the work,” do not reference “operations of law.” And, because Congress deliberately used “operations of law” elsewhere in the Act, its omission in the Act’s discussion of the subject matter of copyright and initial creation
- ↑ Plaintiff’s citation to Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc. is inapposite. See Dkt. 16 at 23–24. In Houghton Mifflin Co., the parties disagreed whether Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf was protected by copyright, with an alleged infringer arguing that the plaintiff lacked standing due to defects in a “carefully drawn document intended to transfer all American rights to publish and sell this work.” 104 F.2d 306, 310 (2d Cir. 1939). The court held only that “if an analogy is to be drawn between literary property and ordinary chattels,” the fact that the publisher owned the manuscript provided circumstantial evidence the copyright had been transferred as well. Id. at 311 (emphasis added). Unlike here, there was no dispute concerning human authorship.
- ↑ Moreover, to the extent that state property law conflicts with the Act, it is preempted by the Supremacy Clause. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (looking at “federal copyright law” to determine whether the state law at issue “st[ood] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”).
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