hundred and one electors, as opposed to fourteen hundred and ninety-nine. This case may be modified, by all the changes incidental to numbers.
To assume that majorities of caucuses, or of ex parte collections of electors, have a right to instruct, is to pretend that the government is a government of party, and not a government of the people. This notion cannot honestly be maintained for an instant. Recommendations emanating from such a source may be entitled to a respectful consideration, but not more so than a counter-recommendation from an opposing party. In all such cases, the intention of the representative system is to constitute the representative a judge between the conflicting opinions, as judges at law are intended to settle questions of law, both being sworn to act on the recognized principles that control society.
In the cases that plainly invade the constitution, the constituents having no power themselves, can dictate none to their representative. Both parties are bound equally to respect that instrument, and neither can evade the obligation, by any direct, or indirect means. This rule covers much of the disputed ground, for they who read the constitution with an honest desire to understand it, can have little difficulty in comprehending most of its important provisions, and no one can claim a right to impose sophistry and selfishness on another, as reason and justice.
As doubtful cases may certainly arise under the constitution, the right of the constituency to influence the representative in instances of that sort, may plausibly be supposed to be greater than in those of constructions plainly proceeding from the excitement and schemes of partisans. Still the power of the constituency to interfere, after an election, beyond the right to urge their own sentiments, as opinions entitled to particular
