respect from their particular representative, is very questionable. The constitution contains the paramount laws of society. These laws are unchangeable, except as they are altered agreeably to prescribed forms, and until thus altered, no evasion of them is admissible. In the necessity of things, every public functionary must be permitted to interpret this instrument for himself, subject to the liabilities and responsibilities, official and otherwise, of his station. In this respect, the legislator, by the nature of his trust, having full power to enact and to repeal, knows no other control than his conscience. The expressed compact between the representative and the constituent, gives to the first an absolute discretionary power, subject to this great rule, and, by the implied, no instructions can ever weaken this high obligation, since it is clearly a governing condition of the bargain between them.
A judge is representative, in a government like this, in a general sense, since he acts for and through the people. Now, it will not be pretended that the people can instruct the courts how to interpret the constitution, although they can alter it, nor should it be contended that the constituency can instruct a representative how to interpret the constitution, when it involves a matter of conscience. The remedy, in the one case, is to alter the constitution; and in the other, to send a new representative, with pledges given previously to the election, to interpret the constitution according to the conceptions of the right, entertained by the constituency. Of course such a pledge ought not to be given, unless given conscientiously.
The constitution specifically guaranties the right of the citizens to assemble and petition congress, a provision that would be a mockery, did that instrument suppose a right to instruct.
