sions, this territory was reduced, especially on the Moravian Field. But our main demands for the Vitoraz and Poštorná districts were saved.
The question of co-terminous boundaries with Jugoslavia was of extreme importance for us, and we did everything possible to gain this point. The Americans from the beginning adopted the ethnographical standpoint. The English pointed to the indefensibility of the so-called corridor from the military point of view, and the Italian delegation was opposed to any such ideas, believing it contrary to future Italian interests that we should be neighbors with the Jugoslavs. France alone adopted our attitude and supported us fully; French military circles realized the importance of our boundaries touching Jugoslav boundaries. But under the circumstances even in the commission the corridor was defeated, and although it was brought up again before the Supreme Council, it was rejected.
The problem of the Rusins of Hungary was solved at the peace conference easily and without a special struggle. The difficult position of the Rusins was evident to everyone; it was plain that their country could be given neither to Magyars, nor to Roumanians nor to Poles, and the population itself of its own accord asked for union with the Czechoslovak Republic. In that way we secured a considerable territorial increase; let me state that in peace conference circles our delegation was held to have been most successful from the point of view of territorial delimitation.
As far as the cause of our Lusatian brothers is concerned, we put before the conference strong demands on their behalf, but we did not achieve as much as we should have wished.
There remains the Teschen problem. The fight was very strenuous. Up to April the territorial commission adhered on three occasions to our views( leaving to the Poles only the district of Bílsko. But since April, after the intervention of the local Teschen commission, the situation turned against us. I want to say that during the whole course of negotiations about Teschen we acted with absolute loyalty, honesty and openness toward the Polish delegation. Unfortunately we did not get in return a single expression of reasonable concession. The Czechoslovak delegation can say with a good conscience that it did everything possible in the interest of friendship with Poland. But the manner in which Polish propaganda sometimes acted toward us was not very loyal or brotherly. Means used against us recalled former Austrian politics. The Poles went so far that they attempted to interfere in our internal affairs, especially in Slovakia. I declare that from our side nothing of the sort was ever done, that our attitude was absolutely correct and honest. I deeply regret that in this controversy we could not reach an agreement; their action is more likely to estrange than to bring together two states which are so vitally interested in living together as friends. The Polish question has been for a century and a half a sore on the body of Europe, and it still remains one of the most pressing European problems.
The disposition of Teschen was not settled definitely, but a plebiscite was determined upon. The situation is favorable to us. We have definite frontiers on all sides, except in Teschen. Peace terms of financial and economic character are on the whole advantageous to us; we are engaged in effective work for the consolidation of our internal conditions, creation of a new financial system, new economic life, building up of a firm administrative machine. Externally we are and will be in favor of a peace-lowing policy. We will not have any aggressive wars, we will only defend ourselves.
In the controversy over Teschen—and under the circumstances we claim the district in its entirety—all these questions will be taken into consideration, and the people of Teschen have the chance to compare and decide to which state they desire to be united and which they prefer.
At this point let me say a few words about a question which disturbed the peace conference a great deal and which resulted in the refusal of Roumania and Jugoslavia to sign the Austrian peace treaty. It is the special treaty dealing with the rights of minorities.
A few words about our Bohemian Germans and our national minorities in general. Our mixed Bohemian-German territory was not for a moment in danger. Even before the end of the war the French promised to oppose firmly any attempt to detach the nationally mixed territory from our state. The question came up at the conference and we had to defend our attitude. Let me say that the reports in Vienna and other German papers were absolutely false. The appeals of the so-called German-Bohemian government were not once discussed at the peace conference; nobody paid any attention to them, and the demands of Germans of Bohemia, as formulated by Vienna and the so-called German-Bohemian government, were never taken seriously
The position of Germans in the Czechoslovak Republic was discussed twice. First, when after our general exposition the commission took up the delimitation of Bohemia; secretary Lansing asked us directly, what territory and to what extent could be separated from Bohemia. We admitted that some of the projecting regions could be ceded as compensation for territory which we preferred; we wanted Kladsko and Upper Silesia in exchange for the district of Asch, Friedland and Šluknov. All the delegations were from the first and unconditionally of the opinion that the nationally mixed territory could not be torn away from the Republic. The question of Germans came up the second time, when
