Page:The Czechoslovak Review, vol3, 1919.djvu/391

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THE CZECHOSLOVAK REVIEW
331


Mayor of Veselí addresses Dr. Beneš.
entire plan which we were the first to preach has been realized almost to the last detail.

Three things were necessary; give out a clear political and war program which culminated in the war cry: destroy Austria-Hungary; start an intensive and reliable work of information and propaganda, and finally organize an army. We realized that the world was fighting and that we must fight also; we realized that without an army we could not exist. And so from the first moment we planned its creation. Let me say again that without an army, without actual belligerency, we could not have achieved our independence. And without a strong, democratic, nationally conscious army we will not be able, as things are today in Europe, to preserve our independence.

It is only right to state gratefully that wherever we came, our own people, our democratic elements in foreign countries, especially the workingmen of both socialist parties, instinctively were already doing what we consciously and with a clear-cut program set for our aim. In France, England, America, Russia, everywhere, our colonies were engaged in political work and many men entered the armies, either as distinct units or as parts of the Allied armies; thus they did independently what our plans provided. It is necessary to add that our American brothers—both Czechs and Slovaks—contributed tremendously to our political success by giving us the necessary financial support from the very first.

Our work at the peace conference undoubtedly will be one of the finest moments of our national history. Questions that we had to meet at the peace conference concerned first of all our territorial demands.

We demanded our national territory—Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Slovakia; we demanded Kladsko (Glatz), part of Upper Silesia, freedom for Lusatian Sorbs, rectification of frontier as against Austria, territorial connection with the Jugoslavs; there was the question of the Danube, the frontier as against the Magyars, and finally the problem of the Rusins of Hungary. Then we had to agree on peace terms in matters of finance, state economy, communications, the problem of the German and Magyar minorities, and finally our most serious problem, an agreement with the Poles and the struggle for Teschen; there were other less important episodes, like the war on Magyar bolshevism, attempted Hapsburg restoration in Budapest etc.


The contest for our territory at the peace conference was severe. After much discussion in various commissions, and after the exposition of our demands on March 5, 1919, the situation was this; we asked our historical frontiers with various rectifications against Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria and Austria; we asked a part of Kladsko, of Upper Silesia and Moravian Field (in Lower Austria.)

As to Slovakia we secured the recognition of the union of Slovakia in principle immediately after the coup of Karolyi. It was declared in a categorical manner that Slovakia is an integral part of the Czechoslovak Republic and that no discussion of this matter would be even admitted by us. The conference at once adopted this attitude and accepted the view that the foundation of Slovak boundaries must be the Danube.

The question of Bohemian boundaries was not solved fully to our satisfaction, but the manner in which this was done illustrates the work and method of the Paris conference. We were given opportunity a number of times to defend our position with reference to historical boundaries before a commission; this commission as a result of our explanations approved rectification of our boundaries on all sides, as well as the annexation of a part of Upper Silesia and Kladsko, to be compensated on our part by the cession of parts of Friedland, Šluknov and Asch. But when this proposal came before the Council of Four, it was decided to adhere to the historical boundaries, because it would be easier, simpler, not requiring special commissions, discussion with Germany etc.

At that time the struggle for Teschen was already going on, for in negotiations at the beginning of February the Allies imposed upon us their first attempt at the solution of this problem. But at that time the question of Teschen did not receive a solution, because the conference avoided all difficult problems and postponed them toward the end. Thus it happened that of all the rectifications of boundaries that we asked for we received in the end only a little territory in Prussian Silesia, which at first we were to receive absolutely, but which later was, as to one half of it, made subject to a plebiscite, when the Germans secured the concession of a plebiscite as against the Poles. As against Austria rectification of frontier were at first conceded to us by the commission to the full extent asked for, but when Austria received certain conces-