an idea as a mental act with an idea as a content of sense or an object of thought, I think I understand what is meant. When I am told that the content of sense or object of thought may therefore be something quite non-mental or even physical, I am, to speak plainly, inclined to feel myself the victim of sophistry. It seems obvious at first sight that a blue is as psychical as a pain or an inferential transition. And though you may argue at length that it is nothing but an external object, I feel all the time that I am being defrauded. You have put the vital character of a certain experience into what you call an act, and I admit that it is specially observable in connection with a certain function. But now you tell me that the main thing in the object, what I value in it and what I want it for, is removed and abolished by the distinction, and the experience as such is left for dead.
Now it is a good point on my side to say that objects of the kind in question cease to be, with the minds which entertain them or
