even with the cessation of those minds' attention. And it seems obvious to me that this is so. But the doctrine of the open door denies the fact; and in any case, this fact would only be an external proof and not an analysis of the essence, and prima facie would not apply to the objects of thought.
I will try to state an argument going deeper into the merits, as I see it, and will support my statement by two applications of it.
The assertion that an object or content has or has not a mental character, ought, it seems to me, if it has any value, to be supported by positive analysis, and not merely by extraneous proof. Whether a certain object is continuous with the nature of mind is no question of mere origin or concomitant variation; it is a question of what sort of thing the object is, and what sort of thing mind is, and whether or no the one is connected with the other by inherent character.
Now if I try to escape the sort of negative sorites or gradual withdrawal of characters by which the so-called "mental" character
