by which the definition of Logical Priority is applied to different cases, is only to be accounted for when we observe that in each case there is in the proposition, admitted pro hac vice to be "the implier," superfluous matter, by which the true reciprocal implication is disguised, and tends to pass unnoticed. But through this implication, in principle always present, an element of the so-called implier—and that its operative element—is implied as well as implier.
And thus we see why our authors' tenets force upon us the curious result that Conclusion is logically prior to Premisses and also Premisses to Conclusion.
It is true, of course, as commonly taught, that the Premisses or Antecedent imply the Conclusion or Consequent, which is therefore a necessary condition of the others' truth, and so far logically prior to them. But it is also true, as is not commonly taught, that there must be in principle for every Consequent or Conclusion a common, minimum, and exclusive Antecedent or pair of Premisses, which the Conclusion or Consequent implies as a necessary condition of its truth, and therefore as so far logically prior to it. Here we see the relative justification of the puzzling doctrine which our authors appeared to maintain—that Antecedent and Premisses on the one hand, and Consequent and Conclusion on the other, are logically prior to each other, each to each. For each has in fact, with reference to the other, one of the two alleged features of logical priority, viz., that it is implied by the other, and is consequently a necessary condition of the other's truth. But the other and negative feature
