of logical priority, the total non-implication of the implier[1] by the implied,[2] is of course irreconcilable with the implication which appears on analysis to exist in both the cases we have discussed and which therefore must be reciprocal. It is this alleged negative feature (depending on the admission of irrelevancies into the implier[3]) which is the cause of the contradiction between the two parts of our authors' doctrine. Without it, this doctrine I believe is both sound and consistent; and all that is necessary to bring its parts into explicit harmony is to substitute logical reciprocity, which can be ascribed to both sides in the antithesis, for logical priority which obviously cannot. The effect of such a modification on the theory of bare conjunction and a loose-knit universe I cannot here discuss.
- ↑ Say "poisoning." See p. 31
- ↑ Say "death."
- ↑ It was pointed out above, p. 67, how Mr. Marvin can maintain on this ground with some vraisemblance (p. 46) that the truth of the Conclusion need not be implied in that of the Premisses; just as it is commonly held on the same ground that the truth of the Premisses is not implied in that of the Conclusion.
