Page:The Elements of the China Challenge (November 2020).pdf/23

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encirclement efforts and as a way to balance against U.S. or Western encroachment in the Indo-Pacific.100

Striving to persuade Europeans to pursue economic opportunities in the East, China is conducting negotiations with Brussels over an EU-China Comprehensive Investment Agreement. Between 2014 and 2019, China leveraged its initial investment in Europe’s eastern and southern periphery through a series of Memorandums of Understanding. Beijing develops these investments through what was originally called its “16+1 cooperation framework,” the nominal purpose of which was greater regional economic integration. In 2019, in the face of growing EU skepticism toward BRI, China turned the 16+1 into the 17+1 by incorporating Greece into the framework. The CCP viewed Athens’ inclusion as a victory, especially given China’s substantial investment in the port of Piraeus and the potential for greater access stemming from other investments in European ports and railroads. With a symbolic nod to the ancient Silk Road connecting the empires of Han and Rome, Italy recently became the first G7 country to sign a BRI MOU.

Despite skepticism in the European core, the UK, France, and Germany remain open to Chinese foreign direct investment, both to achieve greater independence from the United States and as a path out of the Eurozone’s economic struggles. The PRC has greatly increased investment in Europe — from less than $1 billion in 2008 to a high of approximately $42 billion in 2017.101 These large sums promote PRC military and technology interests and include investments in robotics, biotechnology, real estate, financial services, and infrastructure. Beijing uses its enhanced leverage to stifle meaningful criticism of its policies.

Huawei is keen to build Europe’s 5G networks. To the extent that this Chinese “national champion” succeeds, Beijing would obtain access to European states’ information flows, achieve a fuller understanding of their telecommunications vulnerabilities, acquire the ability to disrupt critical infrastructure and intercept sensitive transmissions, and accumulate enormous amounts of data crucial to refining AI algorithms.

Likewise, China pursues opportunities in the civil nuclear markets across Europe, hoping to benefit from long-term partnerships, not least by obtaining control of important elements of European energy infrastructure.102 Backed by state financing, Chinese nuclear companies distort

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