Page:The Elements of the China Challenge (November 2020).pdf/22

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While the PRC and Russia operate as strategic partners, growing power disparities — along with the inevitable distrust that marks relations among authoritarian powers — make the establishment of a formal alliance unlikely.94 As the U.S. Economic and Security Review Commission has observed, “There are a number of areas where Beijing’s and Moscow’s national interests do not align, such as territorial claims and partnerships with countries that Russia or China consider regional rivals.”95 Moreover, Russia’s economic decline and China’s global rise — the PRC’s GDP is about eight times that of Russia’s economy, which suffers from stagnant growth and onerous sanctions96 — render Moscow the “junior partner,” raising Russian concerns that the PLA will become a military threat.97

Europe and the UK

With their advanced economies and considerable diplomatic influence, Europe and the UK have emerged as an important front in the strategic competition between the United States and China. Knowing that a united transatlantic alliance would provide great advantages to the United States and allies and partners in the struggle over the shape of world order, the PRC wields its economic power to divide Europe and the UK from the United States and pull European nations and the British toward Beijing. Beijing does not necessarily seek allies in Europe and the UK; rather, it seeks to dissuade nations in the region from aligning with the United States and to limit the ability of Europe and the UK to unify against China. The PRC wants to convince Europe and the UK that their political future lies not in the free, open, and rules-based international order, but in a new multipolar arrangement that respects geopolitical spheres of influence and regards allegations of internal repression as infringements on national sovereignty.

As early as 2013, China identified Europe as a core component of the Belt and Road Initiative. That year, Xi introduced the Silk Road Economic Belt to “forge closer ties, deepen cooperation, and expand the development space in the Eurasian region.”98 The PRC later announced a New Eurasian Land Bridge traversing Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus and ending in Rotterdam. Beijing also proposed a China-Arctic Ocean-Europe Blue Economic passage, one of three maritime passages.99 Beyond the economic, political, and technological benefits, the PRC sees a BRI-forged direct line from Beijing to Europe as a counter to what it describe as U.S.

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