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Associated Press, December 17, 2018, https://apnews.com/56cfdc2ab6224891a264fc88f70200c8.

107 Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have increased purchases of Israeli subsidiaries in sensitive sectors and invested in Israeli infrastructure projects that overlap with Israel’s defense and technology sector. This has raised serious concerns about protecting the information of shared U.S.-Israel defense and intelligence activities. Chinese SOEs, some of which are known to have completed work for the People’s Liberation Army, have undertaken the building and operating of four major infrastructure projects in Israel, estimated to be worth more than $4 billion. See Shira Efron, Karen Schwindt, and Emily Haskel, Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure, RR3176 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), pp. 18 and 38-39, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3176.html.

108 Shira Efron, Karen Schwindt, and Emily Haskel, Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure, p. 70. See also Ivan Levingston, “U.S. Raises China Concerns Over Israel’s Sale of Largest Seaport,” Bloomberg, October 6, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-06/u-s-raises-china-concerns-over-israel-s-sale-of-largest-seaport.

109 Eleanor Albert, “China in Africa: Backgrounder,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated July 12, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-africa. See also Joseph Goldstein, “Kenyans Say Chinese Investment Brings Racism and Discrimination,” The New York Times, October 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/world/africa/kenya-china-racism.html.

110 Lina Benabdallah, “Spite Won’t Beat China in Africa,” Foreign Policy, January 23, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/23/spite-wont-beat-china-in-africa/. Beijing’s influence operations in Africa have also reshaped voting patterns at the United Nations and other multilateral institutions in ways intended to reorient the international order around China’s goals. See Axel Dreher, et al., “Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 62, No. 1 (March 2018), pp. 182-194, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/62/1/182/4841635.

111 Jenni Marsh, “China Says It Has a ‘Zero-Tolerance Policy’ for Racism, but Discrimination towards Africans Goes Back Decades,” CNN, May 25, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/25/asia/china-anti-african-attacks-history-hnk-intl/index.html; and “Racist Incidents against Africans in China amid Coronavirus Crackdown Spark Outcry,” CBS News, May 23, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/coronavirus-racism-africans-china/.

112 This averages roughly 6.2 billion barrels per day of crude oil, condensate, and refined petroleum. See Justine Barden, “The Bab el-Mandeb is a Strategic Route for Oil and Natural Gas Shipments,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, August 27, 2019, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41073/.

113 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: 2019, p. 16, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf.

114 Huawei had sought to build a transoceanic cable connecting South America to Asia but lost out to

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