Let me point out that during the time of the Fascist Movement demonstrations were carried out in spite of the prohibition, not only in the Stuttgart but also in Central Germany, in the north, in the west, and the east of the Reich. We had then in Thuringia and in Central Germany in July and in August a situation in which the workers had the food supplies in their hands: they seized motor trucks and drove into the country to get supplies directly from the peasants, and nobody had the least doubt that we were on the eve of great events. Undoubtedly, the Cuno strike was the apex of the movement, but it is my profound conviction that it was also the turning point of the movement. When the Social-Democrats entered into the great coalition, the Social-Democratic workers were again filled with illusions.
In the middle of August, as a result of the entry of the Social-Democrats into the Government, a certain ebbing of the revolutionary flood set in. When we came to discuss with the Social-Democrats it appeared that they had set fresh hopes upon the entry of Hilferding into the Government. Social-Democrats who had spontaneously come into our camp, who had taken part in the Cuno strike, became filled with new illusions. The kernel of the problem is to win over the Social-Democratic majority.
Now as to what occurred within the Party. What was the attitude of the Party towards the situation? I remember that we held a session of the Central Committee in September to discuss what our attitude should be towards the situation. A member of the Central Committee expressed the point of view that if conditions were ripe in Saxony we should attack. This the Central Committee at that time rejected, on the ground that they were opposed to this Putschist outlook. On the next day arrived the resolution adopted by the Executive here. And so the whole policy of the Party was directed to that which they had rejected the day before. A plan of attack was adopted which made Central Germany the point of concentration. The Party and the whole Party machinery was then mobilised for the armed uprising. All other Party work, the mobilisation of the masses, the organisation of the Factory Councils, was neglected, since the whole Party machine and all the Party officials were employed exclusively on the problem of arming and organising the fight. And so it came about that all other bridges leading to the proletariat were neglected. In our opinion, one of the greatest errors, which must be attributed to the weakness of the Party, was that the problem moved upon us very rapidly and that we concentrated all the efforts of the Party upon the question of arming.
Comrades, once we were compelled to take part in the formation of the Government, the definite moment for the attack could not be delayed. When the instructions of the Executive arrived to the effect that we should enter the Saxon Government, the comrades at first hesitated to carry this decision into effect.
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