Even before the Communists were in the Government, the Reich Government threatened the Saxon Social Democratic Government that the Reich Executive would take proceedings against it. Our comrades therefore hesitated to carry the resolution into effect. Negotiations were carried on with them; they were obliged to enter the Government, and they did enter the Government.
As events developed the Saxon question of necessity occupied the chief role in the whole International. In my opinion the Saxon problem was not at all faced correctly. We shall very sharply criticise the Saxon Ministers for what they neglected to do. The belief that the Ministers could do a great deal was based upon illusions. The decision that our comrades should participate in the Saxon Government was taken on the basis of reports and representations which were without foundation. The decision was taken in the belief that the arming and mobilisation of the Party and the masses had reached such a stage that this move could be attempted. It was presumed that the defeat of the enemy had gone much further than was actually the case.
Thus we arrived in the position in which the enemy took the offensive and dictated the time of attack. The enemy struck, and we were obliged to say, either there will be a White Dictatorship or we must set up the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. In the first moment of deliberation it was decided to attack and to carry out the plan adopted.
Just previous to October 20 movements which were already in action were checked, so that forces might be preserved in order to be brought into play at the moment decided upon.
Consequently, everything was concentrated upon the armed attack, and only the decisive attack for the decisive fight came into question.
After the fight in Hamburg and after the failure of the Saxon Experiment, the Party could once more rally itself. Very shortly after the session of the Central Committee took place, which attempted to perform a given task, to give a foundation for, or to crystallise the point of view upon which we were at the moment setting. The Central Committee neglected to make a retrospect, to examine what was wrong and what was right. This, of course, led to considerable differences of opinion within the Central Committee and in the districts. Confusion and differences arose because the problem was not clarified by the Central Committee, and this found expression at the sessions of the Central Committee. Since what had already occurred was not explained and clarified, a clear policy could not be thought out.
These differences later, when the Executive sent its letter, gave rise to the attempt to secure clarity on the basis of this letter. The discussion showed that within the Central Committee there were in the main three points of view represented: that of the left—comrades Fischer and Thälmann—that represented
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