Page:The Lessons of the German Events (1924).djvu/38

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V

SPEECH BY COMRADE ZINOVIEV

Comrades, we must examine the situation in which this discussion commenced.

We are all agreed that we have suffered a severe defeat. I think it is an exaggeration to say that we have suffered disaster, but still, the reverse was serious. Our experience is that this is the best test for every revolutionary party and every party policy, and precisely during this defeat must we undergo this test. If we lose heart and paint everything in the darkest colours, then the Party may indeed break up. Now in the time of reverse, every German comrade must show of what he is capable. It is quite easy to be in a good mood during victory, but it is during this period of difficulty that we must show faith in the Party.

Just one word before going into the essentials of the subject. It has been said here that a split in the German Communist Party would mean the collapse of the German Revolution, or at least that the Revolution would be postponed for five years. This is absolutely true. For that reason I think that we must enter into the discussion determined that who ever, irrespective of persons, in the spirit of factionalism, even if out of conviction, threatens the unity of the Party at this particular stage, must be branded as committing a crime against the German working class. Situations arise in which we must be prepared to split, and we have had splits, but situations also arise when we must put up with anything to avoid a split. I assert that we have just such a situation now in Germany. Whoever at this moment is aiming at a split, even from conviction, is objectively aiding the Social-Democrats and the bourgeoisie, and not the German working class.

And now to the essentials of the discussion.

It is attempted to assert here: October was not a mistake, we have not under-estimated, but it was before that, in the beginning of the Ruhr crisis that the present situation arose.

Of course, had we begun to make preparations at the opening of the Ruhr crisis, we would have been much better prepared, and the earlier we would have made our preparations the better it would have been. But this kind of argument can be stretched quite a long way. It is a sophism to endeavour to conceal the error at the point where it was actually committed. We must be honest to ourselves, and if we are we shall discover the error.

The picture which Comrade Koenig described of the incident between the German women and the French soldiers, was interesting. Indeed, the Ruhr situation was the starting point of the whole business.

I have before me the instructions of the Executive to the Communist Delegation of the Frankfurt Conference of March 17, 1923. What did we say?

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