"The Essen Conference was mainly a demonstration conference. The conference of March 17 must be a working conference."
In the circumstances under which the Essen Conference was held even a demonstration was a great political event. The more or less successful co-ordination of the activities of the French and German Communist Parties in connection with the occupation of the Ruhr must not be under-estimated. Merely to repeat the Essen affair at this moment, however, would mean a step backwards. The conference of March 17, and particularly the preliminary conference, have two tasks to perform.
(a) To draw up a real, common, clear, fixed, and concentrated programme of action for the important sections affected.
(b) To draw up and actually carry out a number of organisational and partially conspirative measures.
Then follows a whole chapter dealing with the tasks of the French Party.
Consequently, the Executive saw the tasks ahead, and pointed them out to the Conference. That these tasks. were badly fulfilled, in spite of the fact that the youth in France are now well trained, can, if you will, now be asserted. We have done this sufficiently, but we must not reduce this to a sophism; that because we did not at that time raise the question of armed revolt, therefore, the mistake was committed at that time.
No, the mistake in October was due to the German Party and partly also due to the Executive.
On the question of fixing a date, Comrade Trotsky wrote an article in which he raised the point of a time-table.
That was a mistake. I must say that Radek was opposed to this.
(Brandler: I, too.)
Brandler, too. We decided that the date should be fixed merely for our orientation, and that the question must be settled in Germany. Therefore the question of the date was not a mistake on the part of the Executive or on the part of the Russian Party. We decided in the proper way.
Let me quote to you another document, Our telegram of October 1, 1928, concerning Saxony:—
"As we have estimated that the decisive moment will arrive not later than four, five, or six weeks, we consider it necessary that every position that can bring immediate advantage be occupied. In view of the situation, the question of our entry into the Saxony Government must be raised practically. We must enter on the condition that the Zeigner people are really prepared to defend Saxony against Bavaria and the Fascists, the immediate arming of 50,000 to 60,000, and that General Muller be ignored. The same to apply to Thuringen."
This is a telegram that was decided on in the presence of Brandler. Was it correct, or not? It was absolutely correct,
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