(3) Therefore, the proletarian reserves must, by means of an energetic agitation, be drawn into the vanguard. The sections of the proletariat which are of special importance in the fight (metal workers, miners, railwaymen, agricultural labourers, and State employees) must be reached by special efforts of the Party. All efforts must be devoted to technical preparation. In order to unite the proletariat for the struggle, negotiations be immediately entered into with the Social-democrats locally and centrally, with the view, either to compel the Social-democrats to take up the fight, or to divorce the Social-democratic workers from their treacherous leaders.
(4) In view of the present situation, it is necessary that the Party restrain the comrades from armed revolt for as long as possible, in order to gain time for preparation. In the event, however, of spontaneous uprisings of the working class breaking out, the Party must support them by all means at its disposal. The Party must also parry the blow of the counter-revolution by means of mass action (demonstrations, political strikes), In these actions, armed conflicts should as far as possible be avoided.
(5) In reply to the Stresemann ultimatum, the Party must call a national protest strike, in which armed conflicts are to be avoided. In the event of the Social-democratic Party in Saxony refusing to take up the fight against the Stresemann ultimatum, our comrades must break with the Saxony government, and commence a campaign against them.
(6) All members of the Central Committee must carry out the decisions of the Party. The Central Committee will arrange for a re-distribution of work among its members.
This resolution was adopted unanimously. Comrade Ruth Fischer voted for this Resolution. This was five days after the first defeat in Saxony, after the Chemnitz conference,
Then came the second Saxony phase, namely, the Stresemann ultimatum, &c. The delegation submitted to the Central Committee the decision on the strike. The Central Committee, however, decided to call only a partial strike.
Comrades, we saw the task of the delegation of the Comintern and of the Central Committee as follows: That we have suffered a great defeat—a defeat that will leave its effects for some considerable time perhaps, was clear. There was the danger of panic and extreme disappointment among the masses. The defeat in itself was not as dangerous as this fact. For this reason, we took up the following task: to stop the flight of the masses, to make the Communist Party of Germany once again the rallying centre for the fighting masses, and to resume the fight.
When the Central Committee met it was not quite clear to us
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