yet around which point to rally the masses and on what field action was to be undertaken. The lever of the action was not yet in our hands. That is why the passage in the thesis of the Central Committee, which we submitted, dealing with this point, is not sufficiently concrete. After a few days, it became clear, that the first task of the Party was to prevent itself from being forced underground, Already we had neither freedom of the Press nor freedom of assemble (street demonstrations), We sought to rally the Party on the policy of active struggle. How was this policy accepted? In general, the whole of the Executive was agreed on the question of unemployed demonstrations, &c. On the question of defending these demonstrations, the majority of the Central Committee was agreed. When it came to carrying out this policy, we met the strongest resistance of the Berlin representatives of the Central Committee, who held the view that the bitterness and disappointment of the masses of the Party was so great, that the comrades were not in a position to rally the masses for these demonstrations.
Comrades, the second point of difference was the question of armed demonstrations. The Berlin representatives in opposition to the Hamburg representatives, took the view that we could do nothing, it would only lead to unnecessary bloodshed. Our men cannot march through the streets armed merely with rattles.
It is clear why this policy was adopted. To me, it is clear, that the source of the weakness of the Party and of the masses is their passivity. As long as the masses are not convinced that we Communists at least, are prepared to exert all efforts and take all risks, it will not be possible to draw them into the struggle. What at present prevails among the German proletariat is a reflection of the general position in Germany. The collapse of political activity—extraordinary political passivity of all social classes, with the exception of the militarists. Without military, and without being able to say concretely how we shall be able to arrange for this defence, that was a question of military leadership, I said to myself, we cannot lead the workers for once or a second time into demonstrations and there to be beaten up like dogs, and then say to them come a third time and be beaten up again. Either the demonstrations were a mere gesture, or they had to be protected.
I now proceed from the explanation of the tactic of the delegation of the E.C. to the political analysis, in which I must assert two things. Of course, the first thing in our minds was the causes of our defeat, and we wrote concerning this in our reports to the Executive. The reports are before me. When the Party Committee met, the question was as follows: shall we at this stage enter into an internal Party discussion on the weaknesses and mistakes of the Party or not? My opinion, and the opinion of the whole delegation was that at the moment when the first attempts were being made to rally the Party to bring it to a stand, it was not only
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