inexpedient but totally inadmissible to raise a debate on Party tactics. This is still my opinion to-day.
This was my view, and although I knew, of course, that after such a severe defeat a discussion in the Party must tend to an acute crisis, I held that it was necessary to postpone this until clearness had been reached on two points: whether we have entered into a long preparatory period, in which no great possibilities for action will exist; in that case the Party must solve the matter in the discussion; or we have come through a partial battle into a great battle. In that case the Party will overcome its weakness in that battle.
These are the reasons why I most energetically opposed the opening of the discussion in the middle of November. Naturally, I do not wish to assert, that the delegation and I at that time were in a position to see the full consequences of the defeat. Perhaps I have not read through all our correspondence. What I will say in concluding this discussion may contradict what we under the first impressions of the events, reported to the Executive as being the causes of these events. I do not think it is the first duty of a statesman, if he has said A once to say A for the rest of his life. Sometimes we must say B, sometimes we must even say Y, but sometimes we must even say that it never was A.
I will now begin with the second part of my report.
What were the causes of our great defeat?
Firstly, is it a great defeat? I believe it can be established, that the defeat has thrown us back just when we were so near to achieving our goal. I hold the view, that we have missed a great historical situation, such favourable situation occurs rarely. This is the first thing.
The second thing is, we do not know whether the collapse of capitalism in Germany will come about soon. We, however, must keep the fight in view as long as it is not perfectly clear that it will not take place. A political party cannot say that an event will take place in this way or that. The theoretician can take all possibilities into consideration. The Party leader must ask himself, what do I desire in this relation of forces? If the possibilities are that things will become more acute, then we must decide to accelerate this situation, but I say, although at first we did not deem it necessary to take all possibilities into consideration, that all possibilities exist, including the possibility that the situation will remain bad for a long time; in that case our defeat will be much greater than it is now.
Thirdly, we did not know what would be the effects of this defeat internationally, upon the other Communist Parties.
I do not wish to say a single word to gloss over this defeat.
We must ask ourselves first of all, what were the causes of this defeat ? I find, in the main, two opinions on this matter. Some comrades say the mass of the Party is a good proletarian mass, but the leadership consists of social-democratic officials,
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