Why not make public the affairs of monopolies, so that they cannot buy the votes of electors or legislators? Why not limit the power of wealth in elections? It cannot buy the whole people, can it? If not, why not make our legislators directly responsible to us so that we may watch them? Why not simplify the whole machinery of nomination and election so that we are certain to elect the men we want—men of honesty and strength?
But do not the trusts defy our laws after we have passed them? Who is powerful enough to enforce them for us? The courts? Theoretically, yes, but practically, do we not need something nearer to the legislators—a strong right arm of the legislature? Should we not have a vigilant servant who, with the help of trained experts wily enough to cope with every turn, will relentlessly administer and enforce? Should not this servant be a friend of the poorest citizen, a friend to whom in unfair dealings he may turn and receive justice quickly and surely?
But the efficiency expert will say that we have omitted the principal problem. The German treasurer in the story went down to the unit—the Man. Why not teach the man to look out for his own interests? We must make him more efficient so that he can plant more and make more. This is a difficult task if he is the slave of economic necessity, because it will necessarily cost money. Truly, but can we not obtain some of
