what they deceive: which as it cannot he done, but out of a very universal knowledge of the nature of things, so being performed, it so cleareth man's judgment and election, as it is the less apt to slide into any error.
A Table of the Colours or Appearances of Good and Evil, and their degrees, as places of persuasion and dissuasion, and their several fallacies and the elenches of them.
I.
"Cui cateræ partes vel sectæ secundas unanimiter deferunt, cum singulæ principatum sibi vindicent, melior reliquis videtur. Nam primas quæque ex zelo videtur sumere, secundas autem ex vero et merito tribuere."[1]
So Cicero went about to prove the sect of Academics, which suspended all asseveration, for to be the best: for, saith he, ask a Stoic which philosophy is true, he will prefer his own. Then ask him which approacheth next the truth, he will confess the Academics. So deal with the Epicure, that will scant endure the Stoic to be in sight of him, so soon as he hath placed himself, he will place the Academics next him.
So if a prince took divers competitors to a place, and examined them severally, whom next themselves they would rarest commend, it were like the ablest man should have the most second voices.
The fallax of this colour happeneth oft in respect of envy, for men are accustomed after themselves and their own faction, to incline unto them which are softest, and are least in their way, in despite and derogation of them, that hold them hardest to it. So that this colour of meliority and pre-eminence is a sign of enervation and weakness.
II.
"Cujus excellentia vel exsuperantia melior, id toto genere melias."[2]
Appertaining to this are the forms: "Let us not wander in generalities: Let us compare particular with particular," &c. This appearance, though it seem of strength, and rather logical than rhetorical yet is very oft a fallax.
Sometime because some things are in kind very casual, which if they escape, prove excellent, so that the kind is inferior, because it is so subject to peril, but that which is excellent being proved is superior, as the blossom of March and the blossom of May, whereof the French verse goeth:
"Burgeon de Mars, enfans de Paris,
Si un eschape, il en vaut dix."
So that the blossom of May is generally better than the blossom of March, and yet the best blossom of March is better than the best blossom of May. Sometimes because the nature of some kinds is to be more equal, and more indifferent, and not to have very distant degrees, as hath been noted in the warmer climates, the people are generally more wise, but in the northern climates the wits of chief are greater. So in many armies, if the matter should be tried by duel between two champions, the victory should go on the one side, and yet if it be tried by the gross, it would go on the other side; for excellencies go as it were by chance, but kinds go by a more certain nature, as by discipline in war.
Lastly many kinds have much refuse, which countervail that which they have excellent, and therefore generally metal is more precious than stone; and yet a diamond is more precious than gold.
III.
"Quod ad veritatem refertur majus est quam quod ad opinionem. Modus autem et probatio ejus quod ad opinionem pertinet hæc est, quod quis si clam putaret fore facturus non esset."[3]
So the Epicures say of the Stoics felicity placed in virtue; that it is like the felicity of a player, who if he were left of his auditory and their applause, he would straight be out of heart and countenance, and therefore they call virtue "bonum theatrale." But of riches the poet saith;
"Populus me sibilat,
At mihi plaudo."
And of pleasure,
"Grata sub imo
Gaudia corde premens, vultu simulante pudorem."
The fallax of this colour is somewhat subtile, though the answer to the example be ready, for virtue is not chosen "propter auram popularem." But contrariwise, "maxime omnium teipsum reverere," so as a virtuous man will be virtuous in "solitudine," and not only in "theatro," though percase it will be more strong by glory and fame, as an heat which is doubled by reflection; but that denieth the supposition, it doth not reprehend the fallax, whereof the reprehension is: Allow that virtue, (such as is joined with labour and conflict,) would not be chosen but for fame and opinion, yet it followeth not, that the chief motive of the election should not be real and for itself, for fame may be only "causa impulsiva," and not "causa constituens, or efficiens." As if there were two horses, and the one would do better without the spur than the other: but again, the other with the spur would far exceed the doing of the former, giving him the spur also: yet the latter will be judged to be the better horse. And the form as to say, "Tush, the life of this horse is but in the spur," will not serve as to a wise judgment; for since the ordinary instrument of horsemanship is the spur, and that it is no manner of impediment, nor burden, the horse is not to be accounted the
- ↑ "Since all parties or sects challenge the pre-eminence of the first place to themselves, that to which all the rest with one consent give the second place, seems to be better than the others: for every one seems to take the first place out of self-zeal but to give the second where it is really due."
- ↑ "That kind is altogether best, whose excellence on pre-eminence is best."
- ↑ "That which hath a relation to truth is greater than that which refers to opinion: but the measure and trial of that which belongs to opinion is this: It is that which a man would not do, if he thought of it would not be known."
