less of, which will not do well without the spur, but rather the other is to be reckoned a delicacy, than a virtue: so glory and honour are the spurs to virtue: and although virtue would languish without them, yet since they be always at hand to attend virtue, virtue is not to be said the less chosen for itself, because it needeth the spur of fame and reputation: and therefore that position, "nota ejus rei quod propter opinionem et non propter veritatem eligitur, hæc est; quod quis si, clam putaret fore, tacturus non esset," is reprehended.
IV.
"Quod rem integram servat bonum, quod sine receptu est malum. Nam se recipere non pose impotentiæ autem bonum."[1]
Hereof Æsop framed the fable of the two frogs that consulted together in the time of drought, when many plashes that they had repaired to were dry, what was to be done, and the one propounded to go down into a deep well, because it was like the water would not fail there; but the other answered, yea, but if it do fail, how shall we get up again. And the reason is, that human actions are so uncertain and subject to perils, as that seemeth the best course which hath most passages out of it. Appertaining to this persuasion, the forms are, you shall engage yourself, on the other side, "tantum, quantum voles, sumes ex fortuna," &c. you shall keep the matter in your own hand. The reprehension of it is, that proceeding and resolving in all actions is necessary. For as be saith well, not to resolve, is to resolve, and many times it breeds as many necessities, and engageth as far in some other sort, as to resolve. So it is but the covetous man's disease, translated into power; for the covetous man will enjoy nothing, because he will have his full store and possibility to enjoy the more; so by this reason, a man should execute nothing, because he should be still indifferent, and at liberty to execute any thing. Besides necessity and this same "jacta est alea," hath many times an advantage, because it awaketh the powers of the mind, and strengtheneth endeavour, "cæteris paret necessitate certe superiores istis."
V.
"Quod ex pluribus constat et divisibilibus, est majus quam quod ex paucioribus et magis unum; nam omnia per partes considerata majora videntur, quare et pluralitas partium magnitudinem præ se fert: fortius autem operatur pluralitas partium, si ordo absit, nam inducit similitudinem infiniti, et impedit comprehensionem."[2]
This colour seemeth palpable, for it is not plurality of parts, without majority of parts, that maketh the total greater, yet nevertheless, it often carries the mind away, yea, it deceiveth the sense; as it seemeth to the eye a shorter distance of way, if it be all dead, and continued, than if it have trees or buildings, or any other marks, whereby the eye may divide it. So when a great moneyed man hath divided his chests, and coins, and bags, he seemeth to himself richer than he was, and therefore a way to amplify any thing is, to break it and to make anatomy of it in several parts, and to examine it according to several circumstances. And this maketh the greater show if it be done without order, for confusion maketh things muster more; and besides, what is set down by order and division, doth demonstrate that nothing is left out or omitted, but all is there; whereas if it be without order, both the mind comprehendeth less that which is set down; and besides, it leaveth a suspicion, as if more might be said than is expressed.
This colour deceiveth, if the mind of him that is to be persuaded, do of itself over-conceive, or prejudge of the greatness of any thing; for then the breaking of it will make it seem less, because it maketh it to appear more according to the truth: and therefore if a man be in sickness or pain, the time will seem longer without a clock or hourglass, than with it; for the mind doth value every moment, and then the hour doth rather sum up the moments than divide the day. So in a dead plain the way seemeth longer, because the eye hath preconceived it shorter than the truth, and the frustrating of that maketh it seem longer than the truth. Therefore if any man have an over-great opinion of any thing, then if another think by breaking it into several considerations he shall make it seem greater to him, he will be deceived; and therefore in such cases it is not safe to divide, but to extol the entire, still in general. Another case wherein this colour deceiveth is, when the matter broken or divided is not comprehended by the sense or mind at once, in respect of the distracting or scattering of it; and being entire and not divided, is comprehended; as an hundred pounds in heaps of five pounds will show more than in one gross heap, so as the heaps be all upon one table to be seen at once, otherwise not; as flowers growing scattered in divers beds will show more than if they did grow in one bed, so as all those beds be within a plot, that they be objects to view at once, otherwise not: and therefore men, whose living lieth together in one shire, are commonly counted greater landed than those whose livings are dispersed, though it be more, because of the notice and comprehension. A third case wherein this colour deceiveth, and it is not so properly a case of reprehension, as it is a counter colour, being in effect as large as the colour itself; and that is "omnis compositio indigentiæ cujusdam videtur esse particeps," because if one thing would serve the turn, it were ever best, but the defect and im-
- ↑ "That which keeps a matter safe and entire is good; but what is destitute and unprovided of retreat is bad; for whereas all ability of acting is good, not to be able to withdraw one's self is a kind of impotency."
- ↑ "That which consists of more parts and those divisible, is greater, and more one than what is made up of fewer; for all things when they are looked upon piecemeal seem greater; when also a plurality of parts make a show of bulk considerable, which a plurality of parts affects more strongly, if they be in no certain order; for it then resembles an infinity, and hinders the comprehending of them."
