448 FABLE OF CUPID. And the opinions of Telesius might, indeed, have an air of probability, if man were taken out of nature together with the mechanical arts which try matter, and if we simply looked to the fabric of the world. For it is a kind of pastoral phi losophy, which tranquilly and, as it were, at ease contemplates the world. For, indeed, he is not amiss in laying down the mundane system, but! miserably fails upon the subject of the elements. And there is, indeed, in his system itself, a great failure, in its being supposed capable of an eternal nature, the idea of a chaos and the mutations of the universal scheme of things being altogether omitted. For that philosophy, whether of Tele sius or of the Peripatetics, or any other which so prepares and furnishes its system as not to derive it from chaos, is evidently of slight foundation, and altogether conceived from the narrowness of human imagination. For, so in entire accord ance with sense doth the philosopher assert the eternity of matter, and deny that of the world, (as the world appears to us,) which was the opi nion of the wisest ancients, and to which opinion Democritus seems to have approached. And this is also the testimony of Scripture ; but with this great difference, that the Scriptures derive the origin of matter from God, the philosophers from itself. For, we gather from our faith three dog mas on this point; first, that matter was formed from nothing ; secondly, that the production of the system was through the word of Om nipotence, and not that matter endued itself with form and of itself came forth from chaos ; thirdly, that before the fall that form was the best of those which matter (such as it was created) could take : but to none of these dogmas could these philosophical theories ascend. For they shudder at the thoughts of a creation from nothing, and deem that this form of things was produced after many windings and attempts of matter, nor are they troubled as to conceiving of the most excellent kind of system, since theirs is asserted to be liable to decline and to change. We must, then, rest upon the decisions of faith and upon its supports. But, perhaps, we need not inquire whether that created matter, after a long course of ages, from the power at first put into it could gather and change itself into that most excellent form, (which, leaving these windings, it did im mediately at the command of the Divine word.) For, the representation of time and the formation of a substance are equally miraculous effects of the same omnipotence. But the Divine Nature seems to have designed glorifying itself equally in either emanation: first, by omnipotently work ing upon ens and matter by creating substance from nothing; secondly, upon motion and time, by anticipating the Drder of nature, and accele rating the process of substance. But these per tain to the parable of heaven, where we will discuss more fully what we are now just inti mating; and so we go on to the elements of Telesius. And here I wish it had been univer sally and at once agreed upon, not to fetch entities out of nonentities, and elements out of nonele- ments, and so to fall into manifest contradiction. But an abstract element is not an ens; again, a mortal entity is not an element ; so that a neces sity plainly invincible drives men (if they would be consistent) to the idea of an atom, which is a true ens, having matter, form, dimension, place, antetype, motion, and emanation. It at the same time remains unshaken and eternal during the dissolution of all natural Bodies. For, since there are so many and various corruptions taking place in greater bodies, it is requisite that what remains as the centre immutable, should either be a somewhat potential or very small. But it is not potential, for the first potential cannot be like the rest which are potential, which are one thing in act, another thing in power. But it is requisite that it should be plainly abstract, since it refuses all act and contains all power. And so, it re mains that this immutable should be of the small est size; unless, perchance, some one will assert that no elements exist, but that one thing serves for elements to another, that the law and order of mutation are things constant and eternal, that the essence itself is inconstant and mutable. And it would, indeed, be better plainly to make an asser tion of this sort, than, in laying down some eternal principle, to fall into the still greater ab surdity of making that principle a fantastic one. For, that first method seems to have some design and end, that things should be changed into the world, but this, none, which, for entities, adopts mere notions and mental abstractions. And yet, the impossibility of this being the case I shall hereafter show. Yet, his Hyle pleased Telesius, which he transferred from a later age after the birth of Parmenides philosophy. But Telesius instituted an evidently unaccountable and une qual contest between his elements in action, whether you consider their forces or their kind of war. For, as to their forces, the earth is alone, but the heaven has a great army ; the earth is as a little speck, the heaven hath its immense regions. Nor can it relieve this difficulty that the earth and its connaturals are asserted to be of the most com pact matter, and the heaven and the ethereal sub stances, on the other hand, of the most expanded. For although this indeed is a very essential differ ence, yet it will by no means equalize the forces even with so great an intermediate space. But the strength of the opinion of Telesius turns chiefly upon this, if an equal portion, as it were, of HyJc (according to the quantum, not according to the expansion) be assigned to both acting elements, so that the things can last, and the system be made and established. For whoever will think with Telesius on other points, and will receive the sur passing power of Hyle, especially in so great an
