FABLE OF CUPID.
excess, in one principle compared with another, will involve himself in an inextricable difficulty. In the dialogue, therefore, of Plutarch, "De facie in orbe lunae," this consideration is very wisely proposed, that it is improbable that nature in the dispersion of matter shut up the properties of a compact body into the sole globe of the earth, when there were in the mean time so many revolv ing bodies in the heavens. Yet Gilbertus in dulged to such excess in this imagination as to assert that not only the earth and the moon, but many other solid and opaque globes were scat tered amongst the bodies of light through the ex panse of heaven. Nay, the Peripatetics them selves, after they had made the heavens eternal through their own condition, and things sublunary by succession and renovation, did not imagine that they had sufficiently guarded their tenet till they assigned to the elements as it were equal portions of matter. For this is that which they fable con cerning that tenfold portion by which the surround ing element is superior to the inner element. But I do not bring these things forward, because none of them are to my mind, but to show that it is perfectly improbable and unnatural to maintain with Telesius that the earth is a principle acting in contrariety to the heavens. And the difficulty will be greatly increased if besides the quantum itself we consider the unequal influence and action of the heaven and the earth. For the condition of contest must be lost altogether, if the attack of the hostile weapons be borne by the one side, but do not reach the other, but fall first. But it is plain that the power of the sun is projected toward the earth, but none can promise that the influence of the earth ever reaches the sun. For of all the in fluences of nature, the influence of light and shade is conveyed to the greatest distance and is cir- cumfused with the greatest space or orbit. But the shade of the earth is bounded on this side the sun, whilst the light of the sun, if the earth were transparent, could beat across the globe of the earth. Heat and cold, in particular, (of which we are now treating,) are never found to overcome so great a space in the conveyance of their influence, as Hght and shade. Therefore, if the shade of the earth does not reach the sun, much less is it in accordance with this to suppose that the cold of the earth travels thither. If indeed the sun and heat acted upon certain mediate bodies, whether the influence of a contrary principle could not ascend, or by any means hinder their action, it is requisite that the sun and heat should occupy whatever are the nearest bodies to them, and then should join also the more remote, so that in time the conflagration of Heraclitus should take place by the solar and celestial nature gradually de scending, and making a nearer approach to the earth and its confines. Nor does this well har monize, that that power of imparting and multi plying its own nature and of turning other things VOL. I. 57 into itself, which Telesius attributes to the ele ments, should not operate on similar equally or more than opposite bodies; so that the heaven ought already to be lit up and the stars to be en gaged in mutual conflict. But to come nearer the point, those four demonstrations ought to be set forth, which even singly, much more conjointly, can evidently subvert the philosophy of Telesius respecting the elements. Of these, the first is that there are found in things some actions and effects, even of things the most potent and the most wide ly diffused, which cannot by any means be referred to heat and cold. The second is, that there are found some natures of which heat and cold are the consequences and effects, and that not through the excitation of preinexistent heat, or through the application of heat approximating to them, but through those things by which heat and cold are infused and generated in their first esse. Tke ground of an element, therefore, fails in either side in them, both because there is a something not from them, and because themselves are from something. The third is, that even those which derive their origin from heat and cold, (which cer tainly are very many,) yet proceed from them as from an efficient and organs, not as from their proper and nearest source. Fourthly, that that conjugation of the four connaturals is altogether blended and confused. Therefore I will speak of these singly. But some may think the time mis spent in so minute an examination of the philoso phy of Telesius, a philosopher of no great popu larity or celebrity. But the fastidiousness of such objectors I dismiss. I have a favourable opinion of Telesius, and recognise in him a lover of truth, a profitable servant of science, a reformer of some tenets, and the first indeed of the moderns. Nor have I to do with him so much as Telesius as in his character of restorer of the philosophy of Par- menides, and as such he is entitled to great regard. But my chief reason for so largely discussing this part of our subject is, that in Telesius, who is the first who meets our view, we find occasion to consider very many subjects which can be trans ferred, as replies to following sects, (of whom we shall hereafter speak,) to avoid repetition. For there are fibres of errors, (though of different kinds,) wonderfully complicated, which can yet in many instances be cut away by one answer. But as we began to say, we must see what kind of influences and actions are found in things which cannot by any concord of things or violence of ingenuity be referred to heat and cold. We must assume, then, in the first place, what is granted by Telesius, that the sum of matter remains eternally the same, without increase or diminution. This property, by which matter preserves and sustains itself, he transmits as passive, and as it were pei- taining more to the measure of quantity than to form and action, as if there were no need of n;ck- onino- it to heat or cold, which are consideW tUe
