to those who form their desires and act in accordance with reason, to have knowledge on these points must be very profitable.
Let thus much suffice by way of preface on these three points, the student, the spirit in which our observations should be received, and the object which we propose.
IV
And now, resuming the statement with which we commenced, since all knowledge and moral choice grasps at good of some kind or another, what good is that which we say πολιτικὴ aims at? or, in other words, what is the highest of all the goods which are the objects of action?
So far as name goes, there is a pretty general agreement: for happiness both the multitude and the refined few call it, and “living well” and “doing well” they conceive to be the same with “being happy;” but about the Nature of this Happiness, men dispute, and the multitude do not in their account of it agree with the wise. For some say it is some one of those things which are palpable and apparent, as pleasure or wealth or honour; in fact, some one thing, some another; nay, oftentimes the same man gives a different account of it; for when ill, he calls it health; when poor, wealth: and conscious of their own ignorance, men admire those who talk grandly and above their comprehension. Some again held it to be something by itself, other than and beside these many good things, which is in fact to all these the cause of their being good.
Now to sift all the opinions would be perhaps rather a fruitless task; so it shall suffice to sift those which are most generally current, or are thought to have some reason in them.
[1]And here we must not forget the difference between reasoning from principles, and reasoning to principles: for with good cause did Plato too doubt about this, and inquire whether the right road is from principles or to principles,1095b just as in the racecourse from the judges to the further end, or vice versâ.
Of course, we must begin with what is known; but then
- ↑ P. 4, l. 30. Ἀρχὴ is a word used in this treatise in various significations.
The primary one is “beginning or first cause,” and this runs through all its various uses.
“Rule,” and sometimes “Rulers,” are denoted by this term; the initiative being a property of Rule.
“Principle” is a very usual signification of it, and in fact the most characteristic of the Ethics. The word Principle means “starting—point.” Every action has two beginnings, that of Resolve (οὔ ἕνεκα), and that of Action (ὄθεν ἡ κινήσις). I desire praise of men: this then is the beginning of Resolve. Having considered how it is to be attained, I resolve upon some course, and this Resolve is the beginning of Action. The beginnings of Resolve, Ἀρχαὶ or Motives, when formally stated, are the major premisses of what Aristotle calls the συλλογίσμοι τῶν πρακτῶν i.e. the reasoning into which actions may be analysed.
Thus we say that the desire of human praise was the motive of the Pharisees, or the principle on which they acted.
Their practical syllogism then would stand thus:Whatever gains human praise is to be done;
Public praying and almsgiving gain human praise;
∴Public praying and almsgiving are to be done.The major premisses may be stored up in the mind as rules of action, and this is what is commonly meant by having principles good or bad.
