this is of two kinds[1], what we do know, and what we may know: perhaps then as individuals we must begin with what we do know. Hence the necessity that he should have been well trained in habits, who is to study, with any tolerable chance of profit, the principles of nobleness and justice and moral philosophy generally. For a principle is a matter of fact, and if the fact is sufficiently clear to a man there will be no need in addition of the reason for the fact. And he that has been thus trained either has principles already, or can receive them easily: as for him who neither has nor can receive them, let him hear his sentence from Hesiod:
He is best of all who of himself conceiveth all things;
Good again is he too who can adopt a good suggestion;
But whoso neither of himself conceiveth nor hearing from another
Layeth it to heart;—he is a useless man.
V
But to return from this digression. Now of the Chief Good (i.e. of Happiness) men seem to form their notions from the different modes of life, as we might naturally expect: the many and most low conceive it to be pleasure, and hence they are content with the life of sensual enjoyment. For there are three lines of life which stand out prominently to view: that just mentioned, and the life in society, and, thirdly, the life of contemplation.
Now the many are plainly quite slavish, choosing a life like that of brute animals: yet they obtain some consideration, because many of the great share the tastes of Sardanapalus. The refined and active again conceive it to be honour: for this may be said to be the end of the life in society: yet it is plainly too superficial for the object of our search, because it is thought to rest with those who pay rather than with him who receives it, whereas the Chief Good we feel instinctively must be something which is our own, and not easily to be taken from us.
And besides, men seem to pursue honour, that they may
- ↑ P. 5, l. 1. The difficulty of this passage consists in determining the signification of the terms γνῶριμα ἡμῖν and γνῶριμα ἁπλῶς.
I have translated them without reference to their use elsewhere, as denoting respectively what is and what may be known. All truth is γνῶριμον ἁπλῶς, but that alone ἡμῖν which we individually realise, therefore those principles alone are γνώριμα ἡμῖν which we have received as true. From this appears immediately the necessity of good training as preparatory to the study of Moral Philosophy: for good training in habits will either work principles into our nature, or make us capable of accepting them as soon as they are put before us; which no mere intellectual training can do. The child who has been used to obey his parents may never have heard the fifth Commandment: but it is in the very texture of his nature, and the first time he hears it he will recognise it as morally true and right: the principle is in his case a fact, the reason for which he is as little inclined to ask as any one would be able to prove its truth if he should ask.
But these terms are employed elsewhere (Analytica Post. I. cap. ii. sect. 10) to denote respectively particulars and universals. The latter are so denominated, because principles or laws must be supposed to have existed before the instances of their operation. Justice must have existed before just actions, Redness before red things: but since what we meet with are the concrete instances (from which we gather the principles and laws), the particulars are said to be γνωριμώτερα ἡμῖν.
Adopting this signification gives greater unity to the whole passage, which will then stand thus. The question being whether we are to assume principles, or obtain them by an analysis of facts, Aristotle says, “We must begin of course with what is known: but then this term denotes either particulars or universals: perhaps we then must begin with particulars: and hence the necessity of a previous good training in habits, etc. (which of course is beginning with particular facts), for a fact is a starting—point, and if this be sufficiently clear, there will be no want of the reason for the fact in addition.”
The objection to this method of translation is, that ἀρχαὶ occurs immediately afterwards in the sense of “principles.”Utere tuo judicio nihil enim impedio.
