366 INDEX. on the South Side, 53 — the armament of the works, 55 — strength and dis- position of tin 1 . Russian forces in the Crimea, 56 — abundance of the Rus- sian stores of ammunition and pro- visions, 61 — the Armada seen from Sebastopol, ib. — progress of the works for the land defences, 63 — strength of the garrison left in, 64 — Sebastopol on the day of the Alma, 66 — Korniloff ordered to sink ships in the roadstead of Sebastopol, 60 — tidings of the defeat reach the town, 71 — Korniloff summons a council Of admirals and naval captains, 72 — he proposes to attack the allied fleet, ib. — Captain Zorin's counter-proposal, 76 — Meutschikoff orders the harbour to be closed by sinking ships, 7S— Todleben's survey of tho ground around Sebastopol, 79 — continued retreat of Mentsehikoff's army, 80 — tho doomed ships scuttled, SI — Kor- niloff's further effort to save the ships, ib — ended career of the Black Sea fleet, 84 — the policy of sinking the ships, 87 — Mentschikofi's. idea of a flank march for his field army, 89 — his abandonment of Sebastopol, 90 — its defence left mainly to sailors, ib. — the main army marches out of, 92 — Mentschikofi's want of knowledge of the movements of the Allies, 97 — his retreat to the Katcha, 100 — Mentsehi- koff's three vicegerents left to act in Sebastopol, 101 — the perfect concord between Korniloff and Todlebcn, 116 — Korniloff assumes the command of the North Side, 117 — his despair of being able to defend the North Side, 118— the Russian danger shifted from the North to the South Side, 120— the forces available for the defences of the South Side, ib.— Korniloff in- vested with the supreme command, 125 — his use and extension of his power, ib. — Korniloff and Todlcben devote themselves to the defence of the South Side, 126 — number of avail- able foot in, 128 — the town without tidings of Meutschikoff, 129— desper- ate position of the garrison in, 130 — solemnity enacted on the lines of defences, ib. — enthusiasm excited by Korniloff, 181— Todleben's opinion and plan, 13. — Korniloff and Tod- leben give orders to dismantle the fleet, and apply all its resources to the defence, 137 — Todleben's plan for strengthening the defences, 138 — the Allies might bo swept down by mitrail, 139 — or induced to delay their attack, 140— Todleben's way of adjusting the labour, 112 — all re- sources brought to bear upon the business of defence, ib.— Todleben's personal influence on the workers 145 — Korniloll's real impressions a' this time, 146— 28th Sept still unat. tacked, 147— communication at last from Mentschikoff, 148— his deter- mination to take up a position on the Belbec, 149— this virtually a with- drawal from participation in the defence of, 150— 29th, the Allies still refraining from an attack, 151 — en- couragement of the garrison, ib. — changes wrought in the defences, ib. — the general result which had been attained, 153— the garrison have now an entrenched position, 154 — but no army to man it, ib.— for Mentschikoff still withholds succour, ib. — com- munication received from the field army by Korniloff, 156— its painful significance, ib.— the 30th, the Allies still abstaining from attack, ib.— the advanced-guard of the Russian army on the North Side, ib.— Mentsehi- koff's interview with Korniloff, 157 — his intention still to hold aloof, and leaving Sebastopol to its own resources, 15S — KornilofFs remon- strances, ib. — Todleben's explanation of Mentsi hikolfs course of action, 159 — probable explanation of his conduct, 103— the defence of, during the last six days of September, 164 — circumstances under which the Allies abstained from attacking, 107^ — their first reconnaissance of the defences on the South Side, ib.— the question which really needed solution, 170 — tho counsel of Sir Edmund Lyons, ib. — the proposal for an assault and its rejection by the French, 172 — de- termination to land the siege-trains, 173— Sir George Cathcart's sugges- tions, 174 — renewed counsels from Lyons, 176 — Lord Raglan favours an attack, 177 — unanimity of opinion among the French, 178 — their opinion shared by Burgoyne, ib. — the argu- ment against assaulting without first retting down the enemy's fire, ib. — argument in favour of assaulting at once, 181 — second proposal for the assault of, submitted by Lord Rag- lan to the French, 19S — its rejection, 199 — the opposition of Canrobert, 200 — Lord Raglan's knowledge 01 the instructions given to Canrobert, 202 note— the weight of authority by which Lord Raglan was opposed, 207 — his reserve on the subject of the differences between the French and himself, 208— the effect of abstaining from an assault, 209 — Airey's letter to Lord Hardinge, 210— Todleben's opinion on the opposition to the as- sault, 213 — the third of the 'lost occasions,' 215 — help of the Anglo
