INDEX. 367 French fleet to the besiegers, 216 — the limits of the dominion possessed by the fleet, 219 — the Russians now- secure on the North Side, 220— no investment practicable, 221— the lost opportunity of isolating Sebastopol, 222— change in the whole character of the enterprise, 223— the predica- ment of the Allies, 225— disposition of the allied armies at the commence- ment of the siege, 226— the defensive arrangements of the Allies, 227 — works of circumvallation on the Sapoune Ridge, ib. —disposition of the French force charged with the defence of the Chersonese, 228— posi- tion of the English army, ib. note- strength of the position on the Cher- sonese, 230— separate system of de- fence required for Balaclava, 232— Lord Raglan's arrangements for the defence of, 233— appointment of Sir Colin Campbell to the command at, 233— the position of the French and English Headquarters, 235 — the landing of the siege-train, 236— bri- gade of English seamen placed at the disposal of Lord Raglan, 238— Mentschikoff occupies the Macken- zie Heights, 242 — the garrison be- coming bold, ib.— the plan of attack adopted by the Allies, 244— proposed closer investment of Sebastopol, 246 — Lord Raglan assembles his divi- sional generals of infantry, 247 — their resistance to the proposed measure, ib. — its effect, 248 — Sir John Burgoyne on the decision of the divisional generals, 249— Lord Rag- lan's communication to the French, 250 — batteries commenced by the English, ib. — French advanced posi- tion on Mount Rodolph, 251— they break ground, ib.— progress of the French works, 252 — the enemy's sallies and cannonades, 253 — diffi- culties encountered by the English, ib— the English open their trenches, 254 — desire that the fleets should take part in the attack upon, 256 — Lord Raglan requests aid from Ad- miral Dundas, 264 — Dundas consents to give the help asked, 269— naval conference, ib.— the decision of the admirals, 271— the plan of naval at- tack determined upon, 272 — the ill prospect it offered to the naval forces, ib.— Mentschikoff keeps the fate of Sebastopol in suspense by his reluctance to give it the aid of his field army, 276 — Korniloff writes a remonstrance, 27S — Mentschikoff gives way and supplies help, 279 — strength of the garrison, 6th October, 2S0 — increased hopefulness of the en- deavour to defend, 2S1— close of the period during which the place had been at the mercy of the Allies, 283— the French break ground, 2S4 — pro- gress of the English works, 285— Russian view of the determination of the Allies, 286— sorties undertaken by the Russians, 290 — great progress of the works, 292— increased strength of the land defences of, ib. — the garri- son aware that the bombardment is to commence on the 17th October, 294. Attack of the 17th of October: con- siderations favourable to the pros- pects of the garrison, 295— the ar- rangements of the Allies for cannonad- ing, 296— distribution of the Russian batteries, 298— opening of the lire, 300— nature of the duty in the Rus- sian, French, and English batteries, 302— frail state of the Russian earth- works, 303— Admiral Korniloffs great activity, 306— the state of the con- flict at this time, 313— skilfulness of Todleben's dispositions beginning to tell, 317 — explosion in a French magazine, 318— second explosion in the French lines, 320— Mount Ro- dolph silenced, ib.— messages from Canrobert to Lord Raglan, ib.— the opportunity not seized by the Rus- sians, 321— the English alone engaged with the enemy, ib.— Mentschikoff 's interview with Korniloff, 322 — hia departure from the beleaguered town, 323— meeting of Korniloff and Tod- leben, 326— Korniloffs visit to the fortifications, 327— his death, 331— his death left Sebastopol under di- vided command, 332. The naval attack: time originally fixed for, 334— postponed at the re- quest of the Freuch, 335— new plan of attack insisted upon by the French, 336— particulars of the new plan, 337 — Dundas's reluctant acceptance of the new plan, 339— French plan con- demned by the English captains, 340 —arrangements for the attack, 343 — the great sea-forts which could en- gage the fleets, ib.— the purpose in- volved in the French plan, 345— the French determine to attack the Quar- antine Sea-fort, 346— the steam-power of the Allies, 348— fire opened by the Russian forts, 349 — opening of the fire by the French, 350— the result of the attack, 352— attack by the French fleet on Fort Alexander and its re- sults, ib.— the cause of its failure, 353 — the works which were to be assailed by the in-shore squadron, ib.— the Telegraph Battery and Fort Con- stant ne, 354— the weak angle of the fort, 355— the composition of the in- shore squadron, 358— Dundas's paper of instructions, 360 — fire delivered
