INDEX. 377 War Department, 14 — the Horse Guards, 21 — standing compromise between the Horse Guards and the 'Government,' 26 — quaint expedient of the Letter of Service, ib. — general effect of the standing compromise, 27 — the Ordnance, 2S — the Victualling and the Transport sub-departments of the Admiralty, 29 — the Army Medical service, ib. — the Commis- sariat, S3 — Sir Charles Trevelyan's rapid creation of a Commissariat force for foreign service, 34 — duties, powers, and status of a Commissariat force administering to an English army in the field, 36 — the old army offices without experience derived from recent campaigns, 38 — changes made in our system of war adminis- tration, ib. — the Duke of Newci Secretary of State for War, ib. — the authority he exercised, ib. — general readiness of the old army offices to act under his guidance, 39 — want of official machinery at the disposal of the Duke of Newcastle, ib. — his capa- city as a war administrator, 40 — fur- ther changes made in our administra- tive machinery, ib. — the way in which the offices sought to perform the tasks of war administration, 41— the way in which our dispersed system of war administration proved baneful, 40 — England's practice of foregoing the aid of her Indian officers and admin- istrators in European war, 47 — result of this, 48 — our troops tended upon the 'regimental' system, ib. — one good service at least our offices had rendered, they had upheld in lull vigour our famous time-honoured 'regiments' with the glory of the great days yet clinging to their names, their traditions, their colours, 49. Our system of war administration at the time of the great conflict with France, 50-S3. The way in which France and Eng- land ministered to their armies in the East, S4 — conditions under which the supply of the Allied armies pro- ceeded, ib. — the phases of the Eastern campaign in their bearing upon the question <>i' supply, ib. — the arrange- ments by which Fiance and England at first undertook to supply their armies in the East, 86— change of measures to which they were subse- quently driven, S7 — the magnitude of their task, 8S — undue reliance upon the resources afforded by commerce, ib. — difficulty of promptly acquiring by purchase all the needed supplies, 89 — insufficiency of merchant- vessels, and more especially of steamers, 90 — confusion in the Bosphorus, 91 — the flow of supplies to the seat of war not at once and completely effected, ib. — insufficiency of the steam-power, in its bearing upon the supply of fresh meat and vegetables, 92— the latter stages of supply, 98 — as effected by the French, ib. — by the English, 94— extreme narrowness of the communi- cation through Balaclava, ib. — con- struction of wharves at Balaclava, 95 — roadway between camp and port, ib. — question of ' metalling ' a road before the 17th October, ib. — ques- tion of 'metalling' a road after the 17th of October, 100— Lord Raglan's measures with respect to the ro 1 by the Col, 103 — vain effort made to 'metal' it, 104 — vital importance of having a 'metalled' road, 105 — ques- tion as to how the peril occasioned by the breaking up of the road should have been met, ib. — the road between port and camp becoming almost im- passable, 10S — the means of land- transport declining, 109 — want of for- age, ib. — recourse to England for hay, llu — obstructions there encountered, ib. — constitution of the Treasury, 117 — the incidence of blame, 118— state of the Allied armies before the hur- ricane, 119— the food of the French army, ib.— the food provided for the English army, ib. — the shelter pro- vided for the French army, 124— for the English, ib.— Lord Raglan's mea- sures for hutting the troops, ib. — warm clothing, 125 — provision made by the French for the care of their sick and wounded, 120 — by the Eng- lish, ib. — insufficiency of their pre- parations for the care of the sick and wounded, 127 — undue amount of work that perforce was cast upon the Knglish soldiery, 138— their state of health, 139 — the cyclone of the 14th of November, 142 — Lord Raglau's sense of the disaster, 145 — his mea- sures, ib. — lasting effect of the hur- ricane upon the condition of our I roops, 146. The sufferings of the armies during the winter, 148 — sufferings of the Russian army, ib.— sufferings of the Allied armies, 149 — general charac- teristics of the winter of 1854-55 in the south-west of the Crimea, 150 — and of the state of the ground on the Chersonese, ib. — the evils inseparable from air attempt to wilder the Allied armies without due preparation, ib. — the calamity aggravated by 'avert- ible' evils, 151 — the sufferings and losses sustained by the French army, ib. — shelter and warm clothing, 152 — sufferings from cold, ib. — want of fuel, 153— the horses of the French