laid so much emphasis upon their historical, over and above their ethnographical, claims. In this overlapping of claims I descried a certain danger for the Poles. Both of us saw that, between us, the matter in dispute was comparatively insignificant, and that we must settle it without ill-feeling. But Dmowski did not draft the declaration I had suggested. Dissensions were caused by individuals among our own people, as well as among the Poles, and I had often to take action to prevent public controversy. The Poles complained of oppression in Austrian Silesia and cited the poet Bezruč in proof of it, while our people taxed the Poles with pro-Austrian and pro-German tendencies; and I stopped in the nick of time the publication of an attack upon Brückner, the Slavonic scholar of Berlin University who had shown pro-German leanings.
In Allied circles some degree of nervous irritation against the Poles was noticeable from time to time, and I was more than once obliged to give explanations of Polish policy. The Poles were accused of working with Germany as well as with Austria. From October 14, 1917, onwards, Germany and Austria had set up a Regency Council in Russian Poland. Between the two “liberators” this Regency Council was, one must admit, in a very tight place, for each “liberator” had its own Polish policy and, among the Poles, there were alleged to be pro-Austrian and pro-German tendencies. Austria and Germany had, indeed, one and the same purpose—to use Poland for their own ends. What those ends were can be seen from the fact that the protracted disputes which arose out of the occupation of Poland in 1915 were only settled on August 12, 1916, by an agreement that Poland should belong neither to Austria nor to Germany. But, being stronger than Austria, Germany secured the supreme control of Poland and the command of the Polish army. The Warsaw Government, or Regency Council, recognized this Austro-German agreement more or less officially; and thus a third tendency arose—that of the Regency, which sought to obtain compensation for Galicia and Poznania at the expense of Russia. This tendency derived strength from the anti-Russian feeling of the Poles. At the end of April 1918, the Regency submitted a more definite scheme to Austria and Germany. It was discussed long and fruitlessly because neither Germany nor Austria would say the final word. Thus it came about that, towards the end of September 1918, representatives of the Warsaw Regency visited the Emperor William at Spa and then
