and he certainly knew the mood of the American people and had to take it into account. When I saw the spontaneous celebration of the Armistice in New York—started by a premature report—I understood the President’s views, which Colonel House represented in Paris before the President arrived there. But, even now, especially after the peace and its sequel, I think my view was right.
On points of detail I may say that President Wilson wished the Danzig question to be settled more or less in the way in which it was settled, and that he was not in favour of giving Danzig to Poland. To this I objected that any kind of condominium would create more friction between the Germans and the Poles than the definite attribution of Danzig to Poland, and would keep alive German discontent with the corridor between Germany and the enclave of East Prussia. The President was well-disposed both towards the Poles and the Yugoslavs; and, from several things he said, I got the impression that he did not agree with the Treaty of London on the basis of which Italy had entered the war. I heard afterwards from Paris, when the Italo-Yugoslav conflict became acute, that he knew nothing of this Treaty; but, on the other hand, it was stated on American authority that he had known of it and had forgotten it. I well remember having discussed the Treaty of London with Mr. Lansing, who certainly knew of it. It would assuredly be an interesting and instructive proof of the lack of American interest in European affairs if this Secret Treaty, which the Bolshevists had trumpeted throughout the world and American newspapers had published, really attracted so little attention in the most official American quarter. I know, however, that the Italo-Yugoslav controversy—which turned on the Treaty of London—was brought before the President and the State department by Yugoslav protests while I was in Washington.
When the question was raised in official circles and in the press whether President Wilson in person should take part in the peace negotiations in Europe, I advised him not to do so or, at least, not to remain in Europe after the opening of the Peace Conference. Knowing Wilson’s character and his enthusiasm for the League of Nations as the chief point in a peace settlement, knowing also the personal qualities of the European peace negotiators, I feared that each side would be disappointed with the other. The war had lasted so long and had put so severe a strain upon the minds and nerves of all the men who would meet at the Peace Conference, that
