270 FAMILIAR COLLOQUIES.
things which the law requires, many of them omitted circumcision; did all these perish? Fi. God knows that.
Bu. If a Jew should privately, for fear of being starved, eat swine's flesh, would he be guilty of a crime? Fi. In my opinion, the necessity would excuse the fact; inasmuch as David was excused by the mouth of God himself, that he had ate holy bread, which is called shewbread. contrary to the precept of the law; and did not only eat it himself, but also fed his profane companions with it too. Bu. If any one lay under that necessity that he must either steal or starve, which ought he to choose, to steal or be starved to death? Fi. Perhaps, in that case, theft would not be theft. Bu. How is that? What, is not an egg an egg? Fi. Especially, if he took it with an intention of making a return, and pacifying the owner, as soon as he should be in a capacity to do it. Bu. What if a man must either lose his own life or swear falsely against his neighbour, which must he choose? Fi. Death. Bu. What if he could save his life by committing adultery? Fi. He ought rather to choose death. Bu. What if he could save his life by committing fornication? Fi. They say he ought rather to die. Bu. Why does not an egg cease to be an egg here, especially if there be no force offered or injury done? Fi. There is wrong done to the maiden's body. Bu. What if by perjury? Fi. He ought to die. Bu. What say you as to a simple harmless lie? Fi. They say a man must rather die. But I am of opinion that upon an urgent necessity, or a great advantage, such a sort of a lie rather is no fault, or a very small one; unless it be that having once opened the way, there is danger of our growing into a habit of lying injuriously. Put the case that by a harmless lie a man might save the bodies and souls of his whole country; which would a pious man choose? would he refuse to tell the lie? Bu. What others would do I cannot tell, but as for me, I would make no scruple of telling fifteen as notorious lies as ever Homer told in his life, and presently wash away my guilt with holy water. Fi. I would do the same.
Bu. Well, then, it is not what God has commanded nor what He has forbid that obliges to eternal damnation. Fi. It seems otherwise. Bu. Then the modus of the obligation is not so much from the author of the law as from the matter of it; for some things give way to necessity, and some do not. Fi. It seems so. Bu. What if a priest should be in danger of his life, and should save it by marrying? Whether should he choose? Fi. Death. Bu. When a divine law can give way to necessity, why does not this human law give way to it? Fi. It is not the law that hinders but the vow. Bu. What if any one should make a vow of going to Jerusalem but could not do it without being sure to lose his life, shall he go or shall he die? Fi. Why, he ought to die, unless he can get his vow dispensed with by the pope. Bu. But why may one vow be dispensed with and not another? Fi. Because one is a solemn vow and the other a private one. Bu. What do you mean by a solemn one? Fi. That which is usual. Bu. Why then, is not the other a solemn one which is a daily one? Fi. Yes, but then it is a private one.
Bu. Well, then, if a monk should profess privately before an abbot, would not this be a solemn one? Fi. You trifle. A private vow is the easier discharged, because it is dispensed with the least offence. He
