ICHTHYOPHAGIA; OR, FISH-EATIXG. 271
that makes a private vow does it with this intention, that if it be convenient he may alter his mind. Bu. Then might they vow with this intention that vow perpetual chastity. Fi. They ought so to do. Bu. Then it would be perpetual and not perpetual. What if it were the case of a Carthusian monk that be must either eat meat or die? Whether ought he to choose? Fi. Physicians tell us that there is no flesh so efficacious but aurum potabile, and jewels would answer the end. Bu. Which is the more useful, to succour a person in danger of life with gold and jewels, or with the price of them to succour a great many whose lives are in danger, and to let the sick man have a chicken. Fi. I cannot say as to that. Bu. But the eating of fish or flesh is not of the number of those things that are called substantials. Fi. Let us leave the Carthusians to be their own judge.
Bu. Let us then talk in the general. Sabbath-keeping has been diligently, frequently, and largely inculcated in the law of Moses. Fi. True. Bu. Whether then ought I to relieve a city in danger, neglect ing the sabbath or not? Fi. Do you think me a Jew then? Bu. I wish you were, and a circumcised one too. Fi. The Lord himself had solved that difficulty, saying, the sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath. Bu. Well, then, is that law of force in all human constitutions. Fi. Yes, except anything obstruct. Bu. What if a lawmaker make a law, not with this design, that it should be obligatory upon the pain of eternal damnation, nor indeed unto any guilt, and to have no other force but an exhortation? Fi. Good man, is it not in the lawmaker’s power how far the law shall be binding? He uses his authority in making the law, but as to what it shall oblige to, and what not, that is in the hand of God.
Bu. Why, then, do we hear our parish priests out of the pulpit crying, “To-morrow you must fast, under pain of eternal damnation,” if it does not appear to us how far a human law is binding? Fi. They do this that they may in an especial manner strike terror into the contumacious, for I presume those words do properly belong to them. Bu. Whether they are a terror to the contumacious I know not: they throw weak persons into scruples and danger. Fi. It is a hard matter to suit both. Bu. The power of the law and custom are much the same. Fi. Sometimes custom is the more powerful. Bu. They that introduce a custom, whether they do it with design of bringing any one into a snare or not, they oftentimes bring them into an obligation nolens volens. Fi. I am of your mind. Bu. Custom may lay a burden upon a man when it cannot take it off again. Fi. It may so. Bu. Well, then, now I hope you are sensible how dangerous a thing it is to impose new laws upon men without any necessity or a very great utility. Fi. I confess it.
Bu. When the Lord says, “Swear not at all,” does He render every one that swears obnoxious to the pains of hell? Fi. I think not. I take it to be a counsel and not a command. Bu. But how can that be made clear to my understanding, when He has scarce forbid anything with greater strictness and severity than that we swear not? Fi. You must learn of your teachers. Bu. When Paul gives advice, does he oblige to the pain of damnation? Fi. By no means. Bu. Why so? Fi. Because he will not cast a stumblingblock before the weak. Bu. So then it is in the breast of the maker of the law to lay liable to damnation or
