systems at low cost. Moreover, they can strike with relative impunity from a distance. Besides attacking opponents directly, these actors use the international news media to attempt to influence global public opinion and shape decisionmaker perceptions. 1-14. Terrorists. Terrorist actions range from gaining unauthorized access to C2 systems to physical attacks against commanders and decisionmakers. Terrorist groups have been identified as using commercial INFOSYS—especially computer bulletin boards—to pass intelligence and technical data across international borders. 1-15. Foreign Information Operations Activities. During peace, crisis, and war, foreign nations conduct IO against Army C2 systems, INFOSYS, and information. These actions will, in most cases, mimic those activities of hackers, terrorists, and activist including nonstate actors. Foreign IO activities take advantage of the anonymity offered by computer bulletin boards to hide organized collection or disruption activities. Some also masquerade as unorganized hackers. Their primary targets are often commercial and scientific, rather than military, INFOSYS. In addition, adversaries use IO capabilities— both low-tech and high-tech—to attempt to shape the information environment in their favor. 1-16. During crisis or war, adversary IO may attack commercial INFOSYS and military C2 systems on which Army forces rely. These attacks may take the form of jamming, broadcasting false signals and deceptive transmissions, or generating electromagnetic pulses. In such cases, adversaries can disrupt more than communications. Sensors at all levels can be jammed or triggered to produce misleading information. Commercial systems and sensors are particularly vulnerable to the effects of electromagnetic pulse due to their relatively unshielded architectures. 1-17. Foreign IO may actively seek to manipulate, knowingly or unknowingly, other threat sources. In particular, foreign intelligence services may use the threat of blackmail and other forms of trickery to cause other parties to act or facilitate actions on their behalf. 1-18. Information Fratricide. Information fratricide is the result of employing information operations elements in a way that causes effects in the information environment that impede the conduct of friendly operations or adversely affect friendly forces. A familiar example is friendly force jamming degrading friendly radio communications. However, information fratricide covers other IO aspects as well. Actions, perceptions, and information from friendly forces that create improper impressions can adversely affect IO in sensitive situations. For example, working with an international organization that is locally controlled by a leader opposed to the US effort can give the wrong perception to the local populace. 1-19. Threat sources at all capability levels are present during peace and crises. Commanders consider their presence during war, even while focusing on the combined arms operations of the identified enemy. For example, the threat posed by insiders depends on their access to components of a C2 system. Likewise, a well-funded nonstate actor can pose a greater threat than some less sophisticated foreign intelligence services. Information fratricide also threatens IO success during peace and crisis. Effective staff work is
