undermine their will to fight or resist. These activities can take many forms, from civilian media broadcasts to special operations forces strikes. 1-28. Propaganda seeks to shape the information environment in the adversary’s favor. Strategic propaganda supports adversary strategic or operational objectives by influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of people who can affect friendly operations. Operational and tactical propaganda seeks to incite opposition to friendly operations by targeting audiences in the area of operations (AO). Tactical propaganda may also attempt to influence the attitudes, emotions, motivations, and reasoning of commanders and members of friendly forces. 1-29. Deception is another means of shaping the information environment. However, it is usually targeted against a decisionmaker rather than a large population. Deception operations portray a false image of the situation. Their object is to lead friendly commanders to act in ways that favor the adversary. Common forms of deception include portraying false information about the exact strength and composition of adversary forces, their deployment and orientation, and their intended manner of employment. Military deception operations are deception operations conducted by Army forces (see chapter 4). Evaluation of Information-Environment-Based Threats
1-30. Because the information environment contains more than just technical
threats, commanders evaluate threats from several perspectives. Commanders
and staffs consider the following factors:
• The adversary C2 system. Does the adversary C2 system include
computers, networks, and other digital devices? Or, does the adversary
use less technical ways to exercise C2?
• Sources of information. What is the best way to collect information
from the adversary C2 system? The sophistication and technical
complexity of the adversary C2 system determine the means required to
exploit it.
• Adversary goals and interests. What are adversary short- and longrange
goals? Can friendly forces affect them?
• Influential groups, individuals, and decisionmakers. What individuals
or groups determine adversary or other group actions? These
people may be leaders within the adversary armed forces or government,
or interest groups in the information environment. They may be located
within or outside the AO. Decisionmakers may be commanders or
trusted subordinates.
• Adversary IO resources and capabilities. What resources can
adversaries use to protect their C2 systems or inhibit friendly mission
success? These may change over time. Adversaries may gain, lose, or
reconstitute IO resources and capabilities, based combat actions or outside
support. Accurately understanding current adversary capabilities is
essential to success in a fast-moving operational environment.
• Adversary IO vulnerabilities. Where and how are adversaries
vulnerable? How can friendly forces exploit those vulnerabilities? What
are adversaries doing to keep friendly forces from exploiting them?
