1788.
ſo for ſome time after the commencement of the war. Subſequent, however, to the declaration of independence, the Plaintiff joined the Britiſh army, and, on the return of peace, he removed with other Loyalties to Halifax, where he continues to reſide. On the ſecond Thurſday of May in the year 1778, the legiſlature of Connecticut enacted a law declaring that all the eſtate, real and perſonal, of any perſon or perſons who had joined the enemies of the United States, or had aſſiſted them, or ſhould thereafter do ſo, ſhould be confiſcated; and that, with reſpect to thoſe perſons who had been inhabitants of the State (the laſt ſection of the act providing for the caſe of perſons who had never been inhabitants) the County Court upon application was empowered and directed to give judgment, that all their eſtate ſhould be forfeited to the Commonwealth, and thereupon to appoint adminiſtrators (as in the cafe of interſtates) who were to fell ſuch confiſcated eſtate, inſtitute ſuits, recover and pay debts, and to deliver the ſurplus, if any, into the Treaſury of the State &c. In September 1779, the Plaintiff was proceeded againſt under this law, as one who had been lately as reſident of the town of Newhaven; and, it being duly adjudged that he was guilty of joining the enemies of the United States, his eſtate was declared to be forfeited for the uſe of the State of Connecticut, and certain parts of it was ſeized and ſold; but no ſteps were taken to recover from the Defendant the debt ſaid to be due from him to the Plaintiff, although the Defendant at the time of the confiſcation, and for ſometime afterwards, remained an inhabitant of Connecticut, and has always had property there, liable to legal proceſs.
Under theſe circumſtances, Camp inſtituted this ſuit; in bar of which Lockwood pleaded, hat the confiſcation, by virtue of the act of Connecticut, had diveſted the Plaintiff’s property in the debt, if any was due, and veſted the fame in that State: And to the clemency of this plea the preſent argument was confined, upon a demurred and joiner in demurrer.
The point was firſt opened on the 6th of Auguſt, 1788, and finally argued by Ingerſol, for the Defendant, and Rawle, for the Plaintiff, on the 21ſt of November following.
Ingerſol. The forfeiture of an enemy’s eſtate, moveable or immoveable, and of his rights, corporeal or incorporeal, is a matter of ſtrict ſovereignty, although, by the curteſy of nations, debts are allowed to revive at the concluſion of a war. Lee on Capt. 111. The Plaintiff, however, comes not within the rule reſpecting an enemy, but having been proceeded againſt as a delinquent ſubject, he muſt be conſidered as an attained traitor; and, by ſuch attainder, all his eſtate, real and perſonal, were abſolutely and irrecoverably forfeited. 3 Bac. Abr. 755. And a forfeiture of real and perſonal eſtate extends to things in action as well as in poſſeſſion. 2. Bac.Abr. 577. in which general point of view the law of Pennſylvania has alſo expreſsly regarded the ſubject. 2 State Laws 99. The act of Connecticut is as clear and comprehenſive as words can make it, conſidering the party as actually dead, and appointing adminiſtrators of his
eſtate.
