1788.
eſtate. Nor can the proviſions contained in the treaty of peace affect the queſtion; for, the treaty does not operate like the reverſal of an outlawry, but like a pardon. 22 Vin. tit. Outlawry.
Rawle contended, that, whether the queſtion was conſidered, 1ſt, upon the pleadings here; or, 2dly, upon a ſuppoſition that the ſuit had been inſtituted in Connecticut, the Plaintiff was not barred of his recovery.
1. Arguing the cafe on the pleadings here, he premiſed, that it was a general principle, that nations, with reſpect to each other, muſt be conſidered as individual in a ſtate of nature. Puſſ. lib. 2. c. 3 ſect. 23. 1 Vat. 4. 5. Burlam. 195. Moral entitles, or perſons, are given to them, in order to render them ſubjects of action; but, as to what relates to a nation itſelf, or the property which it has acquited, there is no power that can direct or reſtrain, its conduct. In a ſtate of ſociety private property yields to the general good; but this is not the cafe in a ſtate of nature; and, therefore, it may be taken as an axiom, that where the act of a particular nation veſts in itſelf the property of an individual, whether a ſubject or not, the right, thus acquired, extends no further than the juriſdiction of that nation, and the act on which it is founded can have no extra-territorial force. 1 Vol. 145. This principle has, indeed, been recognized by the practice of the United States. For, there is no inſtance of the agents for forfeited eſtates paſſing from one State into another; but, on the contrary, acts of attainder have always been paſſing againſt the ſame perſon in the ſeveral States where his property was found; which would not, ſurely, have been neceſſary, if, either on general law, or under the articles of Confederation, the act of one State, appropriating private property to its own uſe, had any effect beyond the limits of its own juriſdiction. If then the State which has paſſed the law of confiſcation, has forborne to reduce the Defendants debt into poſſeſſion, and the State where the debtor reſides has no power to do ſo, it neceſſarily follows, that the debt, remaining on its original footing, is liable to the Plaintiff’s demand. When, indeed, the act of Connecticut was paſſed, the Defendant reſided in that State; but when this ſuit was inſituted he had removed hither; and the law is clear, that the debt follows the perſon in every inſtance, except that of a diſtribution in the cafe of inteſtacy. Carth. 373.
2. Conſidering the point, in the ſecond place, upon a ſuppoſition that the action had been brought in Connecticut, the queſtion ariſes, whether a right not reduced into poſſeſſion within due time, can afterwards be recovered? If the adminiſtrators had recovered from the Defendant, it would certainly have been ſufficient to bar the Plaintiff’s claim; but, when the State allowed the debtor to remove from its juriſdiction, an implied power was given to the creditor to purſue him elſewhere. Should a huſband neglect during his life time to recover choſes in action belonging to his wife, ſhe is entitled to them afterwards, and not his executors or adminiſtrators; for, the law will never favor negligence. The reaſoning in this
