434 OCTOBER TERM, 1907. structed, it was made less by the power that could be opposed to them. The Gulf Company was a close corporation, which, starting in Alabama, rapidly extended from Alabama to all the cotton-growing territory. These are some of the points of the testimony which, taken in connection with other testi- mony, and with the terms of the lease and the restriction upon the Shawnee Company, support the conclusions of the Su- preme Court of the Territory. This case presents something more than the lease of propcrty by the Shawnee Company, induced or made necessary by fmancial embarrassment. It presents something more than the acquisition by the Gulf Company of another compress-of a mere addition ?o its business. It presents acts in aid of a scheme of monopoly. Swift Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375. It does not appear whether the Supreme Court based its judgment upon the common law, the Sherman law, act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, or the statutes of Oklahoma. The appellees insist that the law applicable to the case comes from all three sourees. The Sherman law providcs that, "Every contract, combination in form of trust or othcrwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in any territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia is hereby declared illegal." And it has been decided that not only unreasonable but all direct restraints of trade are pro- hibited, the law being thereby distinguished from the common law. But it is contended that it was held in United S?ates v. Trans-Missouri' Fright Association, 166 U.S. 290, and in United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505, that the sale of the good will of a business with an accompanying agreement not to engage in a similar business was not a re- straint of trade within the meaning of the Sherman act. Counsel has discussed with an affluent citation of cases the principle which regulates such contracts, and insists that the lease by the Shawnee Company conforms to such principle. The princil?le is well undemtood. The restraint upon one of the parties must not be greater than protection to the other
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