209 U.S. Opinion of the Court. party requires, and it needs no further explanation than is given in G?bs v. Baltimore Gas Company, 130 U.S. 396. The Supreme Court of the Territory recognized the principle, but said: "Tested by the general principles applicable to con- tracts of this character, this agreement is far more extensive in it? outlook and more onerous in its intention than is nec- essary to afford a fair protection to the lessee." And in this conclusion the statute of the Territory may have had its in- fluence. That statute makes void every contract by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business, except, however, that one who sclis the good will of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a specified cqunty, city or part thereof. Wilson's Statutes, �19, 820. It is clear that the lease of the Shawnee Company to the Gulf Company does not literally comply with this requirement. Whether it cab be limited by construction, as it is contcndcd by appellants it can be, we need not decide. As written, it was, no doubt, con- sidered with other considerations by the court in concluding that "the rcal, the veritable purpose actuating thc officom of the Gulf Compress Company, as discloscd by its plan of operation, and as manifested by the cireumstances surround- ing the conduct of its business and the results of its manage- ment by them is, beyond a reasonable question, to place within their power the control of the compress industry, by purchas- ing or leasing those plants which are advantageously located in each of the hauling districts or territories established by the carriers (railroads) in their cotton tariffs. Within certain boundaries the hauling must be one way, and when the Gulf Company seizes the strategic point, under its lease, compe- tition within that district is annihilated." Decree
�
