Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 1.djvu/486

Postmaster general to prosecute deputies neglecting to settle, andSec. 24. And be it further enacted, That if any deputy postmaster, or other person authorized to receive the postage of letters and packets, shall neglect or refuse to render his accounts, and pay over to the Postmaster General, the balance by him due, at the end of every three months,

---

scribed by law, although he is thereby rendered personally chargeable by the United States with such balances, is not a discharge of such postmasters or their sureties from liability on their official bonds. Nor is an order from the postmaster general to retain those balances, directed to the postmaster, until they should be drawn for by the general post-office. Locke v. The Postmaster General, 3 Mason’s C. C .R. 446. The provisions of law enjoining on the postmaster general to require from his deputies regular periodical settlements and payments, are directory to him, but they form no condition in the contract between the postmasters and their sureties. Ibid. The postmaster general cannot sue in the federal courts under that part of the constitution which gives jurisdiction to those courts in consequence of the character of the party, nor is he authorized to sue by the judiciary act. He comes into the courts of the United States under the authority of an act of Congress, the constitutionality of which rests upon the admission that his suit is a case arising under a law of the United States. Osborn et al. v. The Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738; 5 Cond. Rep. 741. The act of Congress, for regulating the post-office department, does not, in terms, discharge the obligors, in the official bond of a deputy postmaster, from the direct claim of the United States upon them, on the failure of the postmaster general to commence a suit against the defaulting postmaster, within the time prescribed by law. Their liability, therefore, continues. They remain the debtors of the United States. The responsibility of the postmaster general is superadded to, not substituted for, that of the obligors. Dox et al. v. The Postmaster General, 1 Peters, 323. The claim of the United States, upon the official bond of a postmaster, and upon all the parties thereto, is not released by the laches of the postmaster general, to whom the assertion of this claim is entrusted by law. Such laches have no effect, whatsoever, on the claims of the United States, as well on the sureties, as upon the principal in the bond. Ibid. The circuit court of the United States for the District of Columbia, has a right to award a mandamus to the postmaster general of the United States, requiring him to pass to the credit of certain contractors for carrying the United States mail, a sum found to be due to them, by the solicitor of the treasury of the United States, the solicitor acting under the provisions of a special act of Congress. The mandamus does not seek to direct or control the postmaster general in the performance of an official duty, partaking in any respect of an executive character; but to enforce the performance of a mere ministerial act, which neither he, nor the President, has any authority to control. Kendall, Postmaster General v. The United States, on the relation of Stockton and Stokes, 12 Peters, 524. The distinction between the relation of a postmaster to his sworn assistant acting under him, and between master and servant generally, has long been settled; and though the latter relation might sanction the admission of evidence in an action against the postmaster, to show the neglect of the assistant, if it is intended to charge the postmaster with the neglect of the assistant, the pleading must be made up according to the case; and his liability will then only result from his neglect in not properly superintending the discharge of their duties in his office. Dunlop v. Monroe, 7 Cranch, 242; 2 Cond. Rep. 484. Where there are items of debit and credit, in a running account between the postmaster general and the deputy postmasters, in the absence of any specific appropriation by either party, the credits are to be applied to the discharge of the debits antecedently due, in the order of the account. Postmaster General v. Furber, 4 Mason’s C. C. R. 333. The official bonds taken by the postmaster general from his deputies are valid; and the omission to bring suits on such bonds, for the defaults of the principal in such a bond, does not discharge the sureties. Postmaster General v. Reeder, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 678. The mere omission to bring suit on such official bonds, by the postmaster general, against a deputy postmaster, is not, per se, evidence of fraud. Ibid. The giving a new official bond by a deputy poetmaster, does not discharge his sureties under the old bond, for the past or subsequent defaults of the postmaster. Ibid. The order of the postmaster general, to the deputy postmaster, not to remit the money he may receive, but to retain it to answer his drafts, does not discharge the sureties. Ibid. The equity rule of limitations applied to bonds where there has been no demand for twenty years is a mere presumption of payment, not an absolute limitation. Postmaster General v. Rice, Gilpin’s D. C. R. 562. The provisions of the act of March 3, 1825, releasing the sureties of a deputy postmaster where suit is not brought within two years after a default, do not apply to a default which occurred before the passing of the act. Ibid. The law which limits suits by the postmaster general against sureties, to two years after a default of the principal, does not operate in cases of balances unpaid at the end of a quarter which are subsequently liquidated by the receipts of a succeeding one. Postmaster General v. Norvel, Gilpin’s D. C. R. 131. A bond given by a postmaster, with sureties, for the performance of official duties, does not constitute a binding contract, until approved and accepted by the postmaster general. Ibid. The reception and detention of an official bond, by the postmaster general for a considerable time without objection, is sufficient proof of its acceptance. Ibid. The return of a bond to the principal obligor, by the postmaster general, for the purpose of obtaining additional security, affords no proof that it was not accepted; nor does it amount either to a surrender or cancelling of it. Ibid. The postmaster general has a right to require a bond from a deputy postmaster, for the faithful performance of his duties, although such bond is not expressly required by law. Postmaster General v. Rice, Gilpin’s D. C. R. 654.